Ukraine crossed into Russia to DEFEND itself - easier to stop Russian attacks on the ground in Russia than with missiles fired from Ukraine - also to block a railway supplying Russian attacks
- and other defensive goals - US says not escalatory
Ukraine is still advancing in Russia nearly a week into this operation. This shows that Russia is WEAK not strong. A weak opponent is not going to try impossibly to escalate. We’ve seen this in the war before, when Putin had his biggest setback in the war to date when he lost the battle of Kyiv that is when he came closest to offering a genuine peace treaty.
Also Ukraine did this incursion to defend itself from an attack that Russia was about to do into Sumy oblast. So it is defensive not escalatory.
With this incursion, Russia knows full well the future of the Russian Federation is not at any risk from Ukraine. The US says it is not escalatory and they have been very cautious throughout this war
.
TEXT ON GRAPHIC
US says this incursion is DEFENSIVE AND NOT ESCALATORY.
Meanwhile, Putin is downplaying it, it's too embarrassing for him to admit to the full extent of what's happening.
Also, when Russia has a big set-back it de-escalates. When it senses that Ukraine is weak it escalates. It is the opposite of what Putin bluffs. The only time Putin has ever offered anything close to a genuine peace plan is when Russia had its biggest set-back of the war when it lost the battle for Kyiv.
[arrow to railway line] By cutting through this railway line Ukraine stops Russia from supplying large numbers of soldiers that were preparing to cross into Ukraine and attack it.
Ukrainian colonel Vladislav Seleznyov told Nexta that
- Ukraine saw 75,000 Russian troops gathering close to the border
- They were about to attack Ukraine across the border
- Ukraine went on the offensive into Russia to eliminate the bridgeheads that threatened Ukraine.
Map from Wikipedia: August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion.svg - Wikimedia Commons
This is where the US says it is defensive and NOT escalatory:
QUOTE STARTS
Q: Yeah. Thanks. So, just on the Ukraine attacks into Russia, are you concerned that Russia will escalate tensions over this attack, including with the US, nuclear threats, anything like that?
SABRINA SINGH: No, because at the end of the day, Ukraine is fighting for its sovereign territory that its neighbor invaded. So, if we want to de-escalate tensions, as we've said from the beginning, the best way to do that is Putin can make that decision today to withdraw troops from Ukraine.
Ukraine is going to do everything it can to continue to take back its sovereign territory. And that's what we're seeing they're doing in this — what you're referring to in this, you know, Kursk Oblast. We're going to continue to support Ukraine with the capabilities and the systems that they need. We don't feel like this is escalatory in any way. Ukraine is doing what it needs to do to be successful on the battlefield.
. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Conference
Video from: . Andrew Chakhoyan 🇺🇦 (@ChakhoyanAndrew) on X
People sometimes claim Putin must be mad because he invaded Ukraine but remember he thought he'd win in 2 weeks or some say 3 days. He was misinformed but not mad.
There is no way he could think he would win ANYTHING if he used nukes.
And about how weak Russia is compared to NATO:
[by lose quickly, Admiral Radakin means pushed right out of NATO territory, and any missile systems firing at NATO destroyed - NATO wouldn't try to defeat Russia as it is a defensive treaty]
We see the opposite in his behaviour. When Putin thinks he is winning he becomes more aggressive. When he thinks he is losing he turns his thoughts to whether he can negotiate genuine peace treaties with Ukraine.
The Russian Federation is not at risk. Ukraine doesn't even want to attack Moscow, it is very far away. But it is a setback for Russia in the Ukraine war. When Russia loses in the war then Putin's thoughts turn to peace treaties.
We saw that after the biggest loss Russia faced in the war when it lost the battle to take Kyiv and had to surrender nearly half the territory it occupied in Ukraine. That was the only time that Putin proposed a genuine peace treaty.
The Ukrainians were close to possibly signing it (which would also have needed a referendum to confirm). But then at the last minute Russia added a clause saying that the Ukrainians could only ask for security assistance to repel a Russian invasion if the Russians also agreed to that request - a nonsense clause which showed that the Russians weren't genuine after all.
More on that later in this blog post.
But it is still the closest they got yet to a genuine treaty, at the time when Russia was at its most defeated yet in the war.
WHY DID UKRAINE CROSS OVER? TO DESTROY THE BRIDGEHEADS RUSSIA WAS CONSTRUCTING TO ATTACK UKRAINE IN THE OTHER DIRECTION
Ukraine saw a massive gathering of Russian soldiers and equipment just the other side of the Russian border in Kurst oblast. So they knew Russia was about to attack in Sumy like they did in Kharkiv oblast earlier this year.
This time instead of just waiting for Russia to attack them across the border at a time and place of their choosing, Ukraine chose to attack Russia across the border.
This gave Ukraine a big benefit of surprise finding Russia almost unprotected. The main aim is to cut off supplies to the Russian soldiers. Also to do lots of damage behind the front line while they are in Russia. But they may hold onto a part of Russia. This will let them set up a situation where if Russia wants to attack Ukraine it has to fight its way through Russian villages first. Which it won't want to do because the only way Russia knows to fight back is to destroy the villages house by house. They are okay doing that in Ukraine but won’t want to destroy Russian homes.
This will make it harder for Russia to liberate these areas once Ukraine has a strong hold of them
This is from a colonel Vladislav Seleznyov interviewed by Nexta and it makes so much sense of what Ukraine is doing.
Here is a transcript of what the colonel said:
QUOTE STARTS
Well the first thing we have to realize is that any offensive action is a risk. The risk is very serious. Everyone knows that he forces and means that are on the offensive suffer many times more losses than the country that is engaged in defense actions.
But the actions of the Ukrainian defense forces, they are conditioned by their rather complex situation and by the fact that the enemy are committing quite serious resources on the territory of Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions, to continue its actions on the border of our Chernihiv and Sumy regions.
I think that it was within the framework of preventive activities that the Ukrainian army went on the offensive, in order to eliminate the bridgeheads that were currently being formed by Russian troops to conduct attacks on our border area.
After all if the events on the territory of the Kursk region are scaled up respectively the enemy will be forced to deploy its forces and means including from diverse[?] parts of the front where they are concentrated in huge quantities. And here we can talk not only about the north of Kharkiv region but also about the Donetsk direction, and in general abou the Eastern front of the Russian / Ukrainian battlefront.
It is clear that the process of this displacement is quite lengthy and if we are talking about the movement of huge forces and means it can be a stretch in both time and distance, but the key thing is that the enemy will be reforced to reflect events in the Kursk region by weakening other parts of the front where now the enemy strength has multiple advantages.
So I think the events in Kursk region are interconnected with events that are taking place in other parts of the front. And that is a very rational approach.
After all now the Russian side has to reflexively respond to the challenges it is facing as a part of the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region.
Previously the enemy didn't mind where, when, with what forces or means it would attack our defence lines and positions. During the last two days [as of Aug 7] the situation has seriously changed. The actions of the Ukrainian defense forces on this section of the front turned out to be completely unexpected for the Russian occupiers.
Now they are successively forced to redeploy various resources and means from various sections of the front including from the north of the Kharkiv region. But how soon will they be able to implement this mission given that the road and rail infrastructure in this part of the Russian region is not so widespread and not so large? I think that in the future we will see amongst other things, strikes on the deep rear of the Russian Federation, exactly on those places where the redeployment of Russian forces and means will take place.
There are likely many other stretch goals but this alone is sufficient reason to explain it. That Ukraine knew they would have to fight Russia along the Sumy / Kursk oblasts border at some point in the next few weeks and decided to take the initiative and attack first to get the advantage of surprise instead of passively waiting to see what Russia does when.
Based on Ukrainian strategy history this is likely just a small part of a larger plan which we will only see as it unfolds. NOBODY I followed predicted this and Ukraine is likely to have many more surprises in store.
THOUGH US, UK, GERMANY, CANADA ETC SURELY DIDN’T KNOW THE DETAILS IN ADVANCE - THEY MUST HAVE GIVEN UKRAINE THE BASIC GO-AHEAD TO USE THEIR EQUIPMENT IN RUSSIA IN ADVANCE
The US says it didn’t know about it in advance. I think this is likely to be slightly embellishing the truth.
The US surely didn't know what Ukraine was about to do in any detail. But they likely had some advance warning that Ukraine had plans to do an incursion into Russia using their equipment. If it failed they could deny it but if it succeeded then Ukraine had their blessing.
I think one can also be reasonably confident that Ukraine DID CHECK that its allies were okay with it using e.g. the Stryker armoured carrier/
The Stryiker is
designed in Canada
built by Germany
built in Ontario USA
Similarly for the British Spartan and the other equipment from NATO countries that it's using in this incursion.
This does NOT make any of those countries a combatant. It is a raid or incursion planned and executed by Ukraine.
But there is no way they would spring this as a surprise on their NATO partners that suddenly it is using equipment from multiple countries in Russia without okaying it with them first. But it wouldn't have shared the details of how, why, when or where they'd be used.
UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS SOMETIMES MET BY UKRAINIAN SPEAKERS IN KURST OBLAST - HISTORICALLY PART OF UKRAINE BRIEFLY BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION
We have started to get the first videos of the Ukrainian soldiers meeting civilians in Kursk region. Interestingly a few of them speak Ukrainian. Kurks oblast was ethnically Ukrainian when the Soviet Union took it over Devana 🇺🇦 (@DevanaUkraine) on X - very complicated history.
22.3% Ukrainian in 1837, now 0.6% Ukrainian in 2021if Wikipedia got it right.
So the Ukrainian soldiers are sometimes greeted by Ukrainian speakers.
QUOTE STARTS
Are you in danger?
No, but can you give us a lift?
Legs hurt
We’ve got ammunition here, not much space, honestly.
Okay, we’ll go slowly then.
But do you speak Ukrainian?
Yes, although I’m not Ukrainian I do speak it.
So, glory to Ukraine.
Glory!
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1822906476030992473
Or dubbed: Doktor Klein 🇪🇸 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@Doktor_Klein) on X
Original in Ukrainian:
TWEET STARTS Local residents met with 🇺🇦Ukrainian soldiers. It is interesting that local residents speak Ukrainian
Direct speech:. Austin TND (@AustinTnd22475) on X
UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS TREATING RUSSIAN CIVILIANS IN KURSK WELL JUST AS THEY DO IN LIBERATED UKRAINE
The Ukrainians are treating the Russian civilians well.
TWEET STARTS The Ukrainian Armed Forces took control of the village of Poroz in the Belgorod region, and are also making progress in the Kursk region.
They evacuate the damaged equipment and bring in new ones. They are setting up, digging trenches, and settling in.
Only military equipment is expropriated. To the great regret of milbloggers, AFU soldiers are extremely kind and considerate to local residents, - this is confirmed by witnesses -, and discussed "as a miracle" , and it seems to anger Z- propagandists more than anything.
Milblogger also complain about the Ukrainian Armed Forces style - everything is very well-coordinated, competent, motivation and drive are at the highest level, noted Nevzorov.
Even the head of the region, Gladkov, published a video in which the completely unharmed citizens from Poroz say that the Armed Forces of Ukraine released them to go to their relatives. Bricktop_NAFO (@Bricktop_NAFO) on X
SUMMARY GRAPHIC FOR THIS BLOG POST - RUSSIAN FEDERATION NOT THREATENED - LOTS OF UKRAINIAN DEFENSIVE OBJECTIVES
This is the main graphic for this article with the text on the graphic
s
.
TEXT ON GRAPHIC
NO RISK of Russia using nukes
- Russian Federation not threatened
- so far Putin treats it as of no significance
- Putin responds to weakness with aggression
- responds to strength with peace negotiations
Until now Ukraine had to defend this border [with Russia] and Russia could leave it undefended and attack anywhere at any time of its choosing.
Both sides had to defend here (border with occupied Ukraine)
Russia was about to attack here, but Ukraine siezed the initiative [Kursk oblast just south of the Ukrainian incursion]
Ukraine attacked back here and now Russia has to defend its border too.
Russia has to move soldiers away from here [Donbas area]
Likely weakly defended behind the front line
If Ukraine cuts through here Russia will find it very hard to supply Crimea [Kerch bridge]
In 2023: Ukraine forced the Russian navy out of Crimea.
mine fields here washed away by the flood [Dnipro river]
Ukrainian resistance [Melitopol]
Ukraine got through main minefield here [Verbove]
Vulnerable Russian supply road [Azov sea coast]
Russia's dilemma:
- where to defend?
Meanwhile Ukrine raises flag temporarily on Kinburn spit
By attacking first across the border into Kursk oblast, Ukraine
is crossing into friendly territory as many there are historically ethnically Ukrainian and still speak Ukrainian
pre-empts Russia's plans to attack Ukraine from Kursk oblast
Immediate objectives:
cuts through a major railway line at Sudzha which supplies the Russian soldiers attacking Ukraine near Kharkiv city
also cuts off supplies to the concentration of Russian troops just south of them waiting for the orders to invade Ukraine from Kursk oblast into Sumy oblast
Disrupts Russian preparations:
let's Ukraine destroy a lot of equipment on the ground that Russia would need to attack Ukraine from Kursk oblast
let's Ukraine launch heavier drones at Russian air fields further into Russia used to drop glide bombs on Ukraine.
Then in the larger picture
forces Russis to move many soldiers and a lot of equipment away from the fighting in Donbas
nearly doubles the front line that Russia now has to defend against Ukraine
may lead to the West giving permission to use ATACMS deep in Russia against glide bombers attacking Ukraine.
Effect on Russia:
does NOT endanger the Russian Federation, this is only a tiny fraction of a percent of it
embarrassing for Putin
he does NOT want to admit it happened and pretends nothing is happening
For the future
gives Ukraine territory that it could exchange back with Ukraine in a peace treaty
gives Ukraine the initiative for the first time since 2022
Morale:
morale boost for Ukraine and Ukrainian soldiers
shows Russians in the area that Russia is weak and that there really is a war going on not just a "special operation"
by treating the Russians in the area in a friendly way treating the civilians with respect, Ukraine shows the people there they are not the monsters Russian propaganda makes them out to be
A hard area for Russia to win back:
big dilemma for Russia once Ukraine has consolodated its hold, built fortifications etc that Russia will have to bomb, and destroy Russian homes instead of Ukrainian homes to win the territory back
puts future fighting in the area on the Russian rather than the Ukrainian side of the border
Practice for a counteroffensive:
gives Ukraine practice in moving fast in undefended Russian territory in preparation for counteroffensives in occupied Ukraine
occupied Ukraine likewise is likely weakly defended behind the front line so fast advances are still possible there too if Ukraine can get through the front line quickly enough
Ukraine can NEVER liberate the occupied areas street by street like Russia does, it HAS to win by deceit, misdirection, cutting off supplies, and fast advances in surprising places as in 2022.
The map is the Institute for Study of War map for 11th August
Interactive map here, but it changes every day, this is where the background image comes from: Interactive Map: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
Details for 11th August: Institute for the Study of War
It is nothing to worry about, it's defensive.
Essentially what happened is that Ukraine knew that Russia was about to attack them over the border from Kursk oblast into Sumy oblast.
They decided that rather than wait for Russia to decide when and where to attack they would take it to Russia and go over the border and undermine their attempts to prepare to invade Ukraine from a new direction.
That takes the fighting to attack Ukraine onto Russian soil.
They also crossed at a place that lets them take Sudzha which is a small city on an important railway line that supplies the soldiers fighting further south in Kharkiv. This makes it hard for Russia to supply them.
This also forces Russia to move forces to the border between Russia and Ukraine to protect Russia.
Up to now it's been very asymmetrirical. Ukraine has the entire 1000 km of front line in Russia to defend AND the long border between Kharkiv and Sumi oblasts and Russia to defend.
Russia only needed to defend inside Ukraine and had only border police with no fortification, no mine fields and no soldiers along the long border between Russia and unoccupied Ukraine.
That is also why Ukraine was able to get its tanks across and travel so far so fast.
The Russians only had concentrations there where they were already fighting on the Ukrainian side of the border or planned to attack.
So now Rusisa has to stretch their defences across a much longer border. But Ukraine also got many other benefits.
The US says it's not escalatory in any way and both US and Ukraine seay it's defensive.
Russia is pretending to its own people that nothing is happening.
And Ukraine has impressive op sec saying nothign.
So as has happened before both Russia and Ukraine pretend nothing is happening.
Mainstream media isn't giving it much coverage also because of that ukrainian op sec.
It also gives Ukraine experience in traveling fast in Russian held territory behind the front line which they wil have to do in a counteroffensive in occupied Ukraine once they break through the mine fields.
And it was achieved partly because of tech to defeat the Russian drones which they only unveiled with this attack.
It is probably part of a larger plan too, many stretch goals, and to get Russia to weaken their front line in occupied Ukraine probably in preparation for a counteroffensive at the other end of the Russian front line as with when they did a counteroffensive in Kharikiv oblast followed by the one in Kherson oblast.
It takes a long time to move tanks, artillery, air defences, soldiers and that's more than 1000 km tey would have to move them back to meet a counteroffensive say in kherson oblast so Ukraine would try to get as many Russian soldiers to travel away as they can.
It also reveals whether Russia has any soldiers in reserve that could meet a Ukrainian counteroffensive - if they can't send soldiers to stop an offensive into Rusian soil they can't have soldiers to support defense against a counteroffensive.
The media tend to believe Russia and Ukriane says nothing and it suits Ukraine fine for western media not to publicise it
The less media attention the less attention Putin will give it and the more they can do before he realizes what is going on.
His generals always try to assure him that nothing is going on when Russia is losing.
So both Ukraine and Russia have reasons to present a similar picture "nothing happening here you can ignore it". Until suddenly "great surprise actually Ukaine succeeded and ..."
I.e. at some point Ukraine may present a fait accomplish if they decide to hold onto Russian territory there as they may if only a small bit across the border to protect their borders or a vantage point on that important railway supply line.
That seems to have happened now as Ukraine has started telling the world that it controls a large area in Kursk.
‼ Currently, about 1,000 km² of Russian territory is under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, - Syrskyi at the Staff meeting.
. Maria Drutska 🇺🇦 (@maria_drutska) on X
Dubbed in English
https://x.com/ezdubs_bot/status/1823024770616639857
MICK RYAN SUMMARY
He explains that military operations like this are planned in phases.
prelude shaping operations: getting intelligence, preparing the forces for the attack, keeping everything secret, and making sure the supplies are all in place for the operation.
[done]
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. As the Russians slowly but surely redeploy forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into #Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once they reach their limit of exploitation. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦Image
2/ Like all military operations, this will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These would have included intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian force for battle.
It would then have had the
break in batt;es [done]
break through battles [done]
exploitation [in the middle of this]
So right now Ukraine is looking to see what it can do to exploit the breakthrough.
[NOTE: The Russians were very slow to respond to it which has likely given Ukraine more things it can do than it previously expected.]
3/ Other phases will have been planned, including the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ battles, ongoing exploitation and consolidation phases. These phases will have a range of forces and support elements applied to each.
4/ The Ukrainian’s the first phase, the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ are complete. They are currently in an ‘exploitation’ phase. Many operations also normally include a ‘limit of exploitation’ governed by terrain, logistics and reaction of the enemy, as well as the objectives of the operation.
What happens next once they have reached the limit of exploitation? There will be several pre-planned options.
5/ What might be Ukraine’s strategic options once they reach their limit of exploitation? I think they probably have three options. Each will have minor branch plans, as well as opportunities and risks.
Option 1, highest risk
consolidate all the terrain they seized and defend it until negotiation
this is high risk because Ukraine currently controls many long salients - areas it controls for instance a long roads deep into Russian territory - hard to hold onto
6/ Option 1 is for the Ukrainians to consolidate on the terrain they have seized so far and then defend it until some form of negotiation takes place. This is the highest risk option because the Ukrainian dispositions feature multiple small salients which would be easily cut off and destroyed by even a semi-competant Russian commander.Image
7/ The high probably of losing a large number of forces in this scenario makes it a strategic & political liability. Ukraine could lose battalions and brigades, as well as artillery, EW and air defence it could not afford to lose. This option, should it go bad, would also squander the very positive strategic messaging that has been generated by the Ukrainian surprise attack into Russia.
8/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a significant risk to Russian sovereignty and critical assets, and constitute a draw for Russian forces from Ukraine. It might also provide Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. It is questionable whether the downside risks of this option are worth the return however.
Option 2 partial withdrawal
Ukraine would set up fortifications around areas that it sees as more defensible and hold onto those
It would need to make sure it can be supplied from Ukraine to do this
9/ Option 2. The 2nd option is for the Ukrainians to undertake a partial withdrawal from the territory it has seized, back to ground that is more defensible. This is a medium risk option, with a decreased risk of Option 1.
10/ This would rely on the Ukrainians conducting a withdrawal into pre-designated terrain that is easier to defend, requires a smaller quantity of troops to defend, and is able to be supported by fires, logistics and other functions more effectively
11/ This option would also ensure that more troops could be reallocated after the operation to other activities, be they defending in the Donbas or subsequent cross-border attacks into Russia where there is an opportunity to do so.
This allows Ukraine to
maximize political and strategic benefits of their advance
reduce risk of losing their soldiers
requires large numbers of Ukrainian solders to stay in the area and engineering effort to make the defences such as minefields and obstacles
12/ Option 2 allows #Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of the strategic shock, while reducing the risks of losing that combat force. It would still require large numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory, and would demand a major engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trenchlines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations.
Benefits are:
continue to pose risk to Russian eventual control (sovereignty) over the area
give Ukraine leverage in future negotiations
humiliation of Putin
force Russia to withdraw troops from other parts of the front line to protect the rest of Russia
[He doesn’t mention but it also provides a base in Russia to attack its air fields and it also protects the Ukrainian villages on the Sumy border from being on the front line with Russia]
13/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a risk to Russian sovereignty, comprise an ongoing draw for Russian forces from #Ukraine, and to give #Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. The humilitation of Putin and his military is also important. The risks of this opportunity might be worth the potential gains
Finally Ukraine can fully withdraw to the international border with a large body of experienced combat troops for use elsewhere in Ukraine.
14/ The third option for #Ukraine would be to fully withdraw back to the international border between #Russia and #Ukraine. This would permit Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of operation into Russia while preserving a large body of experienced combat troops that might be employed on subsequent offensive operations in 2024 and 2025.
15/ By choosing this option the Ukrainians would be messaging to the Russians that “we can invade and hurt your country if we choose, but we have no wish to occupy our neighbours”. While the Ukrainian invasion may allow Putin to reinforce his point to Russians about the ‘threat from NATO’, he also appears weak because he was not able to punish those who conducted the operation in Kursk.
16/ The objective for this option would be to humilitate Putin, preserve Ukrainian combat forces, while sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s supporters that that can go on the offensive and do so in a manner which does pose an existential risk to the ground forces conducting the operation.
17/ Given the preservation of Ukrainian forces under this option, it will probably be the one that gives Zelenskyy the best domestic political boost and improvement in Ukrainian morale.
18/ A range of factors will have an influence on which option the Ukrainian government chooses. These factors include how the Russians change their force posture in Ukraine (including in the Donbas), the Russian response in Kursk, domestic and international political considerations, and the sustainability of the operation itself.
19/ You can read a much more detailed examination of this issue in my new (free) post at Futura Doctrina. End.
. Kursk's Next Operational Phase
Thread from: Thread by @WarintheFuture on Thread Reader App
TRANSCRIPT OF TWEET VIDEO BY MACER GIFFORD - BRITISH VOLUNTEER FIGHTING IN UKRAINE WHO OFTEN HAS INTERESTING INSIGHTS ON WHAT IS GOING ON ABOUT THE KURSK INCURSION.
His main points are
Russia was about to do another incursion across the border from Kursk into Sumy so Ukraine decided to pre-empt it, since they would have to fight Russia there anyway in a few weeks, to do it on their own terms at a time and place of their choosing on the Russian rather than the Ukrainian side of the border.
It could be just a raid to trash lots of Russian equipment, take soldiers, kill other soldiers and so make it harder for Russia to cross the border into Ukraine in Sumy.
Or it might be that Ukraine holds onto some of the Russian territory so making the front line in Russia rather than Ukraine and a fight over Russian rather than Ukrainian villages and towns.
It crosses a red line that makes Russia look weak not just internationally but to his own people.
[defensive so the Russian Federation is not at risk BTW]by crossing the red line and crossing back again, Ukraine is saying to international allies of Ukraine "Look nothing happens, Russia won't do anything so why not send us those missiles we asked for and give us the permissions we asked for?"
if Ukraine holds onto villages and cities in Russia and retreats slowly the only way Russia knows to advance is to shell the cities and villages to rubble one street at a time. It's been doing that throughout occupied Ukraine but if it does this bombing its own cities and villages its own people will see what Russia is doing to Ukrainians when they find their own homes bombed by Russian bombs.
He also makes a mistaken point about a gas terminal, gas from Kursk goes through Ukraine, to Moldova and Hungary and Ukraine could easily turn it off already.
So here is his transcript
TRANSRIPT STARTS
Hi Guys I thought I'd do a quick update, actually more of an opinion of what's been going on over the last 48 hours with this recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia. I think it's pertinent, I think it's worthwhile sharing a few of my thoughts
....
So what's the big idea, what's the plan?
...
The most obvious is in recent weeks, in the last month, you've seen a lot of fighting around Kharkiv as Russia have attempted to open up a front there. They've failed, they have been pushed back, they have suffered a huge amount of loses in that theatre and I think that's been a huge embarrassment for Russia.
In more recent weeks there's been a lot of talk in the mainstream media about another Russian buildup near the Ukrainian Russian border near Sumy, with the intention of perhaps opening up another front again to extend that front line and try and draw Ukrainian troops away from the East to stretch the Ukrainians and there's been a lot of talk about it.
Well this incursion might be because the Ukrainians want to preempt that attack. They might have seen the Russians building up on the other side of the border, and by pushing through, seeing a weakness, taking a huge amount of prisoners.
Even if this is all it was, by the way. Even if it was just a raid by which the Ukrainians flood across the border, they trash the Russian front line. They take hundreds of prisoners. They kill hundreds if not thousands more and destroy a lot of Russian infrastructure on the other side of the boarder, if that's all it was then mission success. even if they did withdraw in the next week or so.
If they don't withdraw in the next week and they choose to make a stand on the Russian side of the border, again that opens up so many possibilities for Ukraine. As I said, if this was always going to be a new front line, it might as well be a front line sooner rather than later on Ukrainian terms, that alone is good enough.
Even so there's a few good things that have happened.
[leave out what he said about gas - it’s of no benefit to Ukraine to switch off the gas which flows from Sudzha through Ukraine itself]
But I think it's a little bit more interesting than that.
I like the idea of the Ukrainians doing several things, oen being that by putting into Russia it takes the fight to Russia. It crosses one of those red lines so that it makes a mockery of Russia. Putin looks weak not just to the international community but to his own people and it reminds the Russian people that the Ukrainians do have teeth and they will bite back. And it shows how weak Russia can be.
Once you kick in that door, once you get through that hard exterior, just like all dictatorships, there's a soft interior that Putrin hates to show to the world and particlarly hates showing it to his own people.
And by showing the rest of the world that there is a red line that can be crossed, with little to no push-back it reminds them - "Why don't you send us those missiles you denied us? Why don't you send us that extra support we have been asking for?"
So again, crossing a red line and then retreating back across it is a good thing in and of itself.
I also am very interested to see if the Ukrainians do make a stand on the Russian side of the border, what will Russia do? Are they going to destroy those Russian towns and villages just like they have done in Ukraine?
[this refers to the only way Russia knows of advancing against a village held by Ukraine - to shell it and bomb it with glide bombs until all the houses are damaged or destroyed leaving nowhere for the Ukrainians to hide]
Hopefully that will show the Russian people the utter barbarity of what Russia is doing in Ukraine. I think it's a key reminder of that and I think even if the Ukrainians were to pull back and ordinary Russians were to reenter their homes and they see them utterly trashed, blown up, destroyed by Russian bombs, I think again I think that will get put about far and wide by those Russian civliians and I think it wouldn't take long for the news to get out.
It's been a great success. So far its been going incredibly well. There may be more to talk about. ...
[He will know other things about the operations there that he can't share because of Ukrainian operational security reasons]
So anyway those are just some thoughts but by a British volunteer fighter in Ukraine who I've found often has interesting perspectives on what's happening there. His main job has been reconnaissance for Ukraine - traveling far beind the Russian front lines in 2022 - 3 now switched to using those quadcopter drones for reconnaissance and I think he is now in more of a support role but for a fair while he was at the front line sneaking through the rushes across the Dnipro river and deep into Russian territory without them seeing him. Very difficult and dangerous work. But then that became almost impossible for humans because of all the Russian drones and now they use reconnaissance quadcopter drones instead.
NOT GOING TO BLOW UP THE GAS TERMINAL - THE GAS RUNS THROUGH UKRAINE
This incursion temporarily spooked the gas market but from the best sources I can find so far, this incursion is NOT likely to be anything to do with the gas terminal - at least certainly not as a way to turn it off - because the gas flows from Sudzha direclty to Ukraine. It is the only remaining gas pipeline from Russia to Europe and has been open for the duration of the war though the amount of gas has gone down hugely from 90 bcm to 13 bcm. But it is as you say the main source of Russian gas for the countries in the EU that haven't yet phased it out. EU has given them until 2027 to phase out use of Rusisan gas and the ones who haven't done that yet use the gas shipped to EU through Ukraine via Sudzha which also earns a revenue for Urkaine.
So if they wanted to switch it off they could do it in Ukraine itself.
I have seen lots of tweets from uninformed people claiming that Ukraien did this to blow up the gas terminal but it doesn't make sense as an idea when you look at more informed sources.
The people who say this typically don't know that the pipeline runs from Sudzha directly into Ukraine and typically don't know about Ukraine's gas agreement with Russia,
That agreement is set to expire anyway in December 2024. Also, Ukraine may well renew it. They are debating whether to renew it or not. U
So what is special about Sudzha? It is surely the railway line because that is the main source of supplies for a large gathering of soldiers and equipment south of Sudzha that seems to be preparing to cross over into Sumy. It also supplies all the attacks in Karkhiv oblast too.
Now that Ukraine has cut through the railway line then for as long as they have control of it then all the soldiers fighting across the border into Kharkiv oblast have lost control of their most important supply line since the Russian army relies heavily on rail transport. That would be a reason to keep control of Sudzha or once they retreat to keep control of some area of high ground with fire control on the railway and roads there.
If they retreat and this is just a raid then we'd likely also see them blow up railway bridges and road bridges for the same reason - demolition in situ is far more effective for bridges than using missiles and could put some bridges out of action nor some months for heavy railway trains. Plus set lots of mines requiring Russia to demine them which would probably not delay them that long but minimal cost for maximum disruption.
he gas transits from Sudzha through Ukraine. gas pipeline passes through Ukraine to Moldova Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Slovakia. Most other EU countries have stopped using Russian gas long ago. But Ukraine earns $800 million a year from the transit though it has to spend some of that on its own costs for managing the gas. This commercial arrangement with Russia has continued throughout the war. It's not likely Ukraine wants to disrupt it when the arrangement is set to expire in December of this year and their parliament is deliberating whether or not to renew it.
They might continue it to 2027 which is the final EU date for all EU countries to phase out reliance on Russian gas.
Details from the Atlantic Council here - the authors are arguing against continuing the arrangement but it's clear that Ukraine has mixed views and hasn't decided yet.
Another factor is that Slovakia also benefits from revenue from the gas passing through Slovakia. If the gas is cut off then Russia has to keep paying Slovakia but it could argue that its contract doesn't cover "force majeur". If so Slovakia would lose a significant income stream from Russia.
QUOTE STARTS
Meanwhile, the view from Kyiv is muddled at best. The minister of energy has completely ruled out future transit, but the prime minister has nixed an extension of the current agreement, while suggesting that transit still might continue under the right circumstances. The head of the Ukrainian gas transit company has similarly expressed willingness to continue transit at least through 2027, the proposed target date for EU countries to phase out imports of Russian fossil fuels.
The arguments in favor of Ukraine continuing to offer transit are weak, premised on the revenue Ukraine earns from transit and concerns over the availability and price of replacement gas. The first concern is overblown. Although Ukraine currently collects about $800 million per year from transit, that does not account for the costs of operating the system. Given the (EU-style) tariff methodology employed by Ukraine, the actual financial benefit is much less, and in the context of Ukraine’s economy, relatively insignificant at 0.46 percent of GDP.
Concerns about replacing Ukraine transit gas are equally overblown. Countries now dependent on Ukraine transit can easily source replacement gas, particularly LNG. Increases in US and Canadian LNG production in 2025-2026 alone would more than replace Russian gas currently being transited via Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the EU has added around 50 bcm of LNG regasification capacity since 2022. Further capacity expected to come online by the end of 2024 will result in total capacity of about 235 bcm, able to meet over 55 percent of European annual gas demand based on the gas consumption average of the last five years.
The argument that the end of transit would lead to much higher gas prices in Europe is likewise questionable. The EU gas market has currently stabilized and returned to its pre-war price range, and Ukrainian transit accounts for only 4 percent of total European demand.
So why the pressure to continue transit once the agreement lapses if Ukraine transit gas can economically be replaced with gas that doesn’t originate in Russia? In the case of Slovakia, and to a lesser extent Austria, purely financial considerations may be at work. The end of Ukraine transit could hit Slovakia hard, since most of the Ukraine transit gas also transits Slovakia through the Eustream pipeline system. However, Eustream has a ship-or-pay contract with Gazprom extending to 2028, obligating payment by Gazprom even in the absence of transit (although force majeure might excuse non-performance). The economic damage to Austria is likely smaller, since it also earns revenue from non-Russian gas transiting its Baumgarten hub.
...
./ Amid competing pressures, will Ukraine quit its transit of Russian gas?
LARGER PICTURE - UKRAINE MAY BE ABOUT TO TAX RUSSIA ALONG ITS ENTIRE FRONT LINE LOOKING FOR WEAKNESSES
it’s interesting to see that Ukraine has raised a Ukrainian flag on the Kinburn spit for the first time. It’s surely just a raid to put up a flag not occupied. But this means that as it is forcing Russia to respond to this incursion at one end of its very long front with Ukraine it is also drawing its attention to the Kinburn spit at the very opposite end of the line.
. Ukrainian flag raised on Russian-occupied Kinburn
https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1822933167650586752
This is from 2022. The Kinburn spit at first sight seems a very unlikely place for Ukraine to attack because they would have to cross the sea to reach it.
However already back in 2022 the Russian navy weren’t as able to operate as close to Ukraine as this.
Now in 2024, Ukraine has almost complete control over the sea near Ukraine. Russian ships don’t dare to sail there.
Indeed there are no warships left anywhere in Crimea. It might be quite hard for Russia to recapture Kinburn spit if supplied by sea from Ukraine.
If Ukraine got hold of the Kinburn spit then they would have an outpost right near to Crimea with fire control on supplies from Crimea to Kherson oblast or the other way round, supplies from Russia to Crimea via the Azov coast road.
It’s obvious Ukraine is not trying to be secretive here, it is drawing Russia’s attention to Kinburn spit. So maybe it is trying to draw its attention both ways and then press forward wherever Russia is weakest.
WHEN RUSSIA LOST THE BATTLE OF KYIV THAT WAS THE CLOSEST THE RUSSIAN NEGOTIATORS GOT TO PROPOSING A GENUINE PEACE TREATY
Remember the only time that Putin has offered what came close to a genuine peace deal is when Ukraine forced him to withdraw from Kyiv.
The Ukrainians eventually pulled out of it when the Russian negotiators added a nonsense clause to the treaty provision for security arrangements to protect Ukraine from a Russian invasion.
Russia added a clause saying that Russia has to approve any request by Ukraine for military aid to repel a Russian invasion. I.e. the invaded country could only ask for help to protect itself from the invader if the invader also approved the request.
That is when Ukraine realized it wasn't going to be possible to sign it.
But it was the only time that Russia has proposed anything that even came close to looking sensible.
Remember the only time that Putin has offered what came close to a genuine peace deal is when Ukraine forced him to withdraw from Kyiv.
The Ukrainians eventually pulled out of it when the Russian negotiators added a nonsense clause to the treaty provision for security arrangements to protect Ukraine from a Russian invasion.
Russia added a clause saying that Russia has to approve any request by Ukraine for military aid to repel a Russian invasion. I.e. the invaded country could only ask for help to protect itself from the invader if the invader also approved the request.
That is when Ukraine realized it wasn't going to be possible to sign it.
But it was the only time that Russia has proposed anything that even came close to looking sensible.
This is about that nonsense clause that finally ended negotiations in Istanbul in spring 2022:
QUOTE STARTS
To the Ukrainians’ dismay, there was a crucial departure from what Ukrainian negotiators said was discussed in Istanbul. Russia inserted a clause saying that all guarantor states, including Russia, had to approve the response if Ukraine were attacked. In effect, Moscow could invade Ukraine again and then veto any military intervention on Ukraine’s behalf — a seemingly absurd condition that Kyiv quickly identified as a dealbreaker.
“The Guarantor States and Ukraine agree that in the event of an armed attack on Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States … on the basis of a decision agreed upon by all Guarantor States, will provide … assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack…”
With that change, a member of the Ukrainian negotiating team said, “we had no interest in continuing the talks.”
. Ukraine-Russia Peace Is as Elusive as Ever. But in 2022 They Were Talking.
But even then - that's the closest that Russia and Ukraine have got to a peace treaty - after Ukraine won against Russia and prevented Russia from taking Kyive and forced them out of nearly half the previously occupied area of Ukraine. So this is why Ukraine is fighting. Even if it doesn't get back all of Ukraine it can set up conditions for Russia to come to the table for a genuine peace treaty instead of a surrender request.
That is what will happen if Ukraine has big successes against Russia. Not Russia doing an impossible escalation which it can't do, Russia retreating from large areas of occupied Ukraine as it did in spring 2022 and then more in a mood to discuss a genuine peace treaty.
SMOKE AT ZAPORIZHZHIA POWER STATION IS JUST A BURNING PILE OF AUTOMOBILE TIRES NEAR A COOLING TOWER
There is no risk to you or anyone. This action of burning tires in a cooling tower is just symbolic. It won't even harm anyone living right next to the cooling tower.
I think they are all in cold shutdown. Until recently units 5 and 6 were in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat for the site but I think they are both in cold shutdown now if I understand right.
. Ukraine: Current status of nuclear power installations
There is absolutely no nuclear risk.
The worst could happen if someone did a direct hit on a reactor cooling pond with something massive e.g. a one ton glide bomb - it would spread radioactivity around the area that's all.
A nuclear reactor can't explode. A working nuclear reactor can do a melt-down but very difficult to trigger because of all the fail safes but these are in cold shut-down and it is impossible for the to do a melt-down. A melt down just means they get a runaway reaction that melts the fuel and it then sinks down into the ground below and spreads out until the reaction stops.
But this is nothing like that it’s just burning tires.
QUOTE STARTS
According to unofficial information received from sources from the opposite bank, the Russians set fire to a large number of automobile tires in cooling towers.
Perhaps this is a provocation, or an attempt to create panic in the settlements on the right bank of the former reservoir.
Currently, the ZNPP is operating as normal as possible under the conditions of occupation.
Please calm down.
(Google translate)
Translation of page here https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/33394
Kyiv Independent article here: Russian forces start fire at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Ukraine says
SO WHAT IS UKRAINE’S OBJECTIVE LONGER TERM? NOT TO ATTACK RUSSIA BUT TO LIBERATE OCCUPIED UKRAINE - THE LAST THING UKRAINE WANTS TO DO IS TO MARCH ON MOSCOW - BUT USEFUL PRACTICE FOR A COUNTEROFFENSIVE BEHIND THE RUSSIAN DEFENSIVE LINES IN OCCUPIED UKRAINE
It is defensive, it will reduce the Russian army's ability to attack Ukraine. Ukraine is NOT going to go on a march on Moscow like the Wagner group. Its focus is protecting the border with Ukraine and attacking the weapons / equipment / soldiers that Russia is using to attack Ukraine.
Remember Ukraine is focused on
1. Preventing Russia from attacking Ukraine from afar with bombers and doing new incursions into Ukraine
2. Stopping the advances by Russia in Donbas and other areas.
3. liberating large areas of occupied Ukraine.
This incursion into Kursk is just subsidiary to those aims, it is NOT Ukraine's objective. It will only do it for as long as it helps with those aims to liberate occupied Ukraine.
It is already helping with 1. and 2. It has probably prevented a Russian attack on Sumy oblast. It has also forced Russia to remove some of its soldiers fighting in Donbas to move towards Kursk reducing the pressure on the Ukrainian soldiers there.
Meanwhile Ukraine had to have some soldiers defending its border anyway while until now Russia didn't. So Russia is much more affected than Ukraine is and Ukraine has the benefit of surprise.
Normally the attacker loses far more soldiers and far more equipment than the defender but Kursk was so lightly defended that Ukraine likely lost much less than would be expected.
And Ukraine is advancing into Russia NOT TO TAKE RUSSIAN TERRITORY. It is doing this in order to destroy Russia's capabilities to attack Ukraine - there must be many military targets within reach that they can get to.
And as it retreats it will likely do things like destroy military installations, destroy bridges etc - it is probably also doing long distance reconnaissance and sabotage operations from the furthest limits of where it got to.
But 3. is where it's at for Ukraine. So I expect this to be followed by a counteroffensive of some sort somewhere else along the very long front line with Russia. The Ukrainians teased Russia by putting up a Ukrainian flag on Kinburn spit at the very far end of the line as far as possible from Kursk.
So they are trying to give Russia lots of puzzles, it has to stretch its army along a front line 1000 km long already - and now it has to send some of those soldiers and some of that equipment to defend another border that's several hundred kilometers long that it never had to defend before.
That plus all the chaos of soldiers and equipment having to get up and move hundreds of kilometers to a new war zone is likely to create opportunities.
So Ukraine would be looking for those and it likely has other plans just as surprising and confusing for Russia as this one.
Once Russia is fully committed to defending in Kursk and trying to fight back against Ukraine, then you can expect Ukraine to do something else somewhere else.
So I think that somehow, we don't know how yet, it leads to Ukraine liberating a large area of occupied Ukraine. Either this year or next year. If this year then likely before the end of November when the best fighting season ends over most of Ukraine.
And at that point it is just possible that Putin throws in the towel and concedes defeat if Ukraine liberates a large enough area fast enough but far more likely this continues to 2025
As an example if Ukraine was to do an advance south from Verove where they are nearly through the front line anything like this and they can advance quickly then they would easily encircle Tokmak and could then have fire control on the Azove coast road.
That is not my idea. That is one of several ideas people talked about in fall 2023 which is not that long ago.
If Ukraine gets through the front lines anywhere along the front line in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia oblast - this incursion in Kursk could give an idea of how quickly they could take very large areas before Russia can respond to stop them - if Russia leaves any of that area weak enough for them to get through in a surprise attack.
The thing is that Russia has a very very wide mine field along the front line there, and deep fortifications and those dragon's teeth. But if Ukraine can get through it then there is likely very little by way of defences behind them.
Russia could then become very vulnerable especially if Ukraine has air control of the counteroffensive like it seems to have to some extent in Kursk oblast.
So I think this is practice for a counteroffensive as perhaps its main purpose. They could use some of the same soldiers for that counteroffensive.