Ukraine war will not encourage China to invade Taiwan - the opposite - highlights how risky it would be for China internationally and also militarily
[wrote this a couple of years ago, copied it here today from Quora]
There is no way the Ukraine war would encourage China - indeed the sinking of the Moskva would highlight how vulnerable an invasion navy would be trying to invade Taiwan.
Video for this article:
Nobody has ever tried a naval invasion of an island with modern weapons on both sides. China do have ambitions for Taiwan, but the experience of Russia trying to invade Ukraine will hardly be encouraging, Taiwan would be far harder, and need an invasion army ten times as large as Russia had, and on boats too, boats carrying tanks and facing modern missiles from Taiwan.
Nobody has ever conducted a war like that with modern weapons on both sides
Were it to occur, the battle for Taiwan would involve other complexities that are vital but squishy, meaning they cannot be satisfactorily quantified. It would be the first country-on-country war where both attacker and defender had modern, long range missiles in their arsenals capable of cracking open ships and devastating land targets with precision from hundreds of kilometers away. No one actually knows what such a fight would look like because it’s never happened before.
Taiwan is very hard to invade from the sea, few suitable beaches for an invasion overlooked by earthquake hardened skyscrapers and high ground.
Unlike Normandy, the coastal terrain here is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles. Linkou Beach near Taipei provides an illustrative example. Towering directly over the beach is Guanyin Mountain (615 meters). On its right flank is the Linkou Plateau (250 meters), and to its left is Yangming Mountain (1,094 meters). Structures made of steel-reinforced concrete blanket the surrounding valleys. Taiwan gets hits by typhoons and earthquakes all the time, so each building and bridge is designed to withstand severe buffeting.
And they would need thousands of ships to transport a million or more people to the island.
If the PLA ground force was a million or more men, then we might expect an armada of thousands or even tens of thousands of ships to deliver them. The vast majority of these ships would not be from the PLA Navy. Vessels like tugs, oilers, barges, ferries, fishing boats, semi-submersible platforms, container carriers, and heavy roll-on/roll-off cargo ships would be mobilized. According to Chinese military doctrine, many ships would be deployed as decoys, conducting feints to distract attention away from the main assault.
There is no way China would be encouraged by the failure of Russia to try the far far harder war with Taiwan which would involve crossing the sea in
thousands of amphibious landing craft large enough to carry tanks
to carry 2 million Chinese soldiers over to the Island to fight there,
faced with modern missiles from the Taiwanese
then to try to storm it from small invasion beaches overlooked by cliffs or earthquake hardened skyscrapers.
They haven't even buijlt that vast navy of landing craft that they'd need.
Nobody has ever tried such an invasion with modern weapons on both sides
Look at Urkaine sinking the Moskva - what could 'Taiwan do to many thousands of amphibious landing craft attempting to attack from China
?
This will NOT encourage China to attack Taiwan!
Moskva sunk by just two small Neptune sea skimming missiles.
China would need to attack Taiwan with thousands of tank landing craft.
It hasn’t built them and they would be vulnerable to modern precision guided missiles crossing a strait of 130 km (81 miles) width at its narrowest
At its narrowest the Taiwan strait is 130 km (81 mi; 70 nmi) wide - compare English Channel 21 mi (18 nmi; 34 km) at its narrowest or less than a third of the distance.
Indeed invading an island has always been very hard, Hitler never tried to invade the UK a much shorter distance away over the English Channel although he had control of France just the other side of the channel. .
Also China has no combat experience this century with modern weapons - they have plenty of exercises but only their older officers would have any experience of actual combat rather than just exercises. They look at Russia which has been involved in many wars this century trying a land invasion of Ukraine a far easier target - and they would have nearly all the same problems and more in Taiwan.
Ukraine was Russia's first ever attempt at such a major offensive since WWII and the first ever such campaign by the modern Russian Federation, and it failed in all its initial goals.
This is an article by the Center for Strategic and International Studies by its Senior Vice President Seth Jones written before the war, about how difficult an invasion of Ukraine would be, Many of the things he predicted actually happened, and more.
There is a Russian expression: “the first blini is always a mess.” In the case of an invasion of Ukraine, Russia will be conducting its largest combined arms operation since the Battle of Berlin in 1945.
: Russia’s Possible Invasion of Ukrain
“the first blini is always a mess.” The invasion of Ukraine was Russia's largest combined arms operation since the Battle of Berlin in 1945. Before the war started experts predicted it would be a mess.
If Putin could somehow talk to himself on 23rd February with the knowledge he now has he would surely stay to call off the invasion. He is just doubling down on his mistake now
.
Andrei Kozyrev, Former Russian Federation Foreign minister under Yeltsin
Believes Putin is a rational actor Wouldn't use nukes
Key points
1. Putin believed his own propagandists that Ukraine was run by Nazis
2. Much of Russia's military budget stolen and spent on megayachts etc - Putin didn't realise how much
3. Putin thought Biden was mentally inept and EU weak and didn't expect the strong response
Putin is a rational actor who miscalculated.
Horrific, immoral, wrong, but not irrational.
Does not believe Putin would use nukes
See
Ukraine is far easier to invade than Taiwan because of the island advantage.
China might not have the same problems of oligarchs or corruption.
However, China has far less experience of fighting a war than Russia - never fought any major war in the 21st century and many of their officers, all except the very oldest will have no real world combat experience, only exercises.
In the 1960s China was involved in the Vietnam war on the opposite side from the USA
.
Most Chinese sailors and soldiers have no combat experience. They fought no battles in half a century except:
1988: 1500+ sailors in 3 frigates occupied Johnson South Reef in Spratly islands after battle with Vietnamese sailors.
A sailor 18 in 1988 will be 52 today
1979: small land battle with Vietnam, lasted less than 4 weeks, no ships.
Background images: sailors from: Chinese sailors stand in formation before a visit by
and: Watch: Chinese Navy (PLAN) Creates Multiple Records While Practicing 'Taiwan Invasion'
China’s last war of any size was the Sino-Vietnamese war 17 February – 16 March 1979 (3 weeks and 6 days). During this war China captured the city of Lạng Sơn with population of about 200,000 and a smaller nearby town Sa Pa with population around 10,000 and then withdrew.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War
Apart from that - China claimed some uninhabited islands in the Spratly islands in the South China sea with a skirmish with the Vietnamese in 1988
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson_South_Reef_Skirmish
That’s about it. See the Wikipedia list of wars involving China.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
AFAIK NOBODY HAS ATTEMPTED A SEA INVASION OF A WELL DEFENDED ISLAND WITH MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WITH MODERN WEAPONS
Meanwhile nobody has ever attempted a sea invasion of a well defended island with millions of people living there, and with both sides with modern equipment and nobody knows how it will go.
At least none of the military analysts I read gave any previous examples and surely they would if there was one.
Again looking at military history - the only recent example I can find is the USA’s botched secret attempt to invade Cuba with 1,400 soldiers in 1961, to overthrow Fidel Castro:
The UK of course was invaded in the far past, by the French in the Battle of Hasting
s
. File:Normans Bayeux.jpg - Wikimedia Commons
Also by the Vikings, Angles, and further back the Romans.
In modern times, Argentina did invade the Falkland islands in 1985, but they only had a population of a couple of thousand.
. Occupation of the Falkland Islands - Wikipedia
Hitler never seriously attempted to invade the UK in WW2. The UK was ready but he never came.
D-Day is an invsion across the sea in the opposite direction. In WWII there’s the invasion of the Phillipines, and the bombing campaign that lead to surrender of Japan eventually.
None of those can be translated into the present day
CHINA HASN’T BUILT THE BOATS FOR AN INVASION ANYWAY AND WOULD HAVE MANY OF THE SAME PROBLEMS AS RUSSIA
There is just no way China does this anyway. They haven't built all the tank transporting boats they would need for this invasion - the boats just don't exist - and though they wouldn't have the oligarchs problem that Russia had - their equipment would be okay - they would have the problems of
morale,
ethnic Chinese fighting other Chinese in Taiwan,
defenders morale advantage,
inexperience of never having waged a war like that before etc.
So, the example of the Ukraine war will for sure discourage not encourage China.
I go into how difficult Taiwan is to invade here based on military analysis sources:
. Why China won’t invade Taiwan
TAIWAN’S ASYMMETRICAL DEFENCE STRATEGY USES ITS ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES
Up to 2019, Taiwan focused on fighting against the Chinese ships across the entire Taiwanese strait. Now however the aim is to rapidly deply defense capabitiies to cover the defensive zone up to 100 kilometes from the island in all directions
To paraphrase key points in Drew Thompson’s article outlining the new defence plan in “War on the Rocks”:
Large surface vessels will use Taiwan’s anti-ship cruise missiles, the Hsiung Feng 2 and 3 along with the Harpoon missiles. These ships include French-built Lafayette class frigates, U.S.-built Kidd-class destroyers, and U.S.-designed Perry class frigates.They also have fast attack Tuojiang class catamarans with 16 missiles each.
Taiwan has more of its Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles mounted on trucks which disperse to survive the attack and will fire back at the Chinese ships throughout the attempted invasion
Taiwan’s navy will rapidly deploy mines in the deep and shallow waters off suspected landing beaches - they have built a new fleet of automated, fast minelaying ships for this mission. Meanwhile they can install mine launching rails on surface vessels.
Fast attack boats and truck-launched anti-ship cruise missiles target key ships in the invasion force, particularly amphibious landing ships carrying the initial wave of PLA assault troops as well as roll-on-roll-off vessels carrying follow-on vehicles and armor.
Taiwan Army lays beach mines, and targets enemy shipss, including minesweepers.
Precision artillery will target any vessels and troops reaching shore, using area effects weapons such as indigenously built multiple launch rocket systems with cluster munitions, and attack helicopters including AH-64E Apaches.
integrated air defenses, including Patriot PAC-3 batteries and domestically manufactured Tian Kung-2 surface to air missiles defend air bases and critical infrastructure from Chinese fighter jets
Smaller mobile air defense systems, such as U.S.-provided Avenger systems prevent the PLA Air Force from providing close-in air support to their invading forces.
See Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept
In that article, Drew Thompson says that the Taiwanese airforce would be unlikely to play a decisive role because of the damage to the Taiwanese runways:
Taiwan’s vulnerable runways and the inability to disperse outside the range of Chinese strikes makes the Taiwan Air Force’s fixed-wing assets unlikely to play a decisive role in a conflict. The president of Taiwan has expressed interest in acquiring F-35B short-takeoff fighters, but even that capable aircraft is unlikely to be able to operate effectively following PLA strikes that will devastate Taiwan’s airbases. The Taiwan Air Force’s future fighter will primarily serve a deterrent role defending Taiwan’s airspace in peacetime. The Air Force will make its wartime contributions with mobile air defenses, small drones, and maintaining critical infrastructure to enable a joint defense.
See Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept
However other sources suggest that the airforce might play a useful role. The fighter jets are well protected with many of them in underground hangars and can land and take off from ordinary highways. They can also repair the runways very quickly after an attack.
TAIWAN HAS ONLY 14 SMALL INVASION BEACHES
Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches and they have cliffs, mountains and tall strong buildings around them designed to withstand earthquakes, where defenders can hide and fire down on the invasion fleet.
Unlike Normandy, the coastal terrain here is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles. Linkou Beach near Taipei provides an illustrative example. Towering directly over the beach is Guanyin Mountain (615 meters). On its right flank is the Linkou Plateau (250 meters), and to its left is Yangming Mountain (1,094 meters). Structures made of steel-reinforced concrete blanket the surrounding valleys. Taiwan gets hits by typhoons and earthquakes all the time, so each building and bridge is designed to withstand severe buffeting.
CHINA CAN ONLY INVADE IN TWO MONTHS OF THE YEAR, APRIL OR OCTOBER AND TAIWAN WILL KNOW ABOUT THE INVASION MORE THAN 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE
This is from an article In Foreign Policy magazine in 2018 by Tanner Greer based on two studies by Michael Beckley, political scientist at Tufts University, and an Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute,what a war would be like.
They say Taiwan can win a war against China despite the difference in sizes of their military and their military budget because of their strategic advantages as an islan.
Grounded in statistics, training manuals, and planning documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.
First, they say that there is no way that the PLA (China) can surprise Taiwan.
There are only two months of the year when the weather is good enough, April or October. Of those two, October is better because there can be fogs in April
.
. Taiwan Can Win a War With China
The scale of the invasion is just too large to hide.
Easton estimates that Taiwan, USA and Japan would know 60 days in advance that they were preparing and be certain that they plan an invasion 30 days in advance.
The Taiwanese would have plenty of time to
Move command and control into their hardened tunnels in the mountains
Detain people they suspect of being agents of China.
Lay their sea mines.
Disperse their fleets,
Disperse and camouflage their army
Distribute weaons to the 2.5 million Taiwanese reservists.
Economy on war footing
They then describe the beaches. They say only 13 (so slight difference in estimate of 14).
They say that the paths from the beachesto the capital would be booby trapped, and skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords to intercept helicopters.
. Taiwan Can Win a War With China
WE’D SEE PREPARATIONS MANY MONTHS IN ADVANCE
We'd see the preparation for such a very huge invasion as would be needed to try to get a foothold on Taiwan with massive preparations in China.
Some of them described here, many months in advance.
Six or twelve months - stop any soldier from leaving their army.
Three to six months - stop all training and focus on maintaining all the equipment and expand capacity
three or four months - national mobilization including vast numbers
of civilian ships including roll on / off ferries comandeered and sent to the coast opposite Taiwan.
QUOTE If China decides to fight a war of choice over Taiwan, strategic surprise would be a casualty of the sheer scale of the undertaking. Even if Xi were tempted to launch a quick campaign and hope that Taiwan’s will to fight would quickly collapse, Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine probably has induced more caution in Beijing. Such a roll of the dice on China’s part would be far riskier than Russia’s land invasion, not only because the PLA would have to conduct the largest and farthest amphibious invasion in modern history, but also because—unlike in Ukraine—cautious PLA war planners would have to assume that the United States and some of its regional allies would quickly commit combat forces to the island’s defense. Any invasion of Taiwan will not be secret for months prior to Beijing’s initiation of hostilities. It would be a national, all-of-regime undertaking for a war potentially lasting years.
. how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053
TAIWAN HAS 190,000 SOLDIERS BUT CAN EXPAND THAT TO AT LEAST 450,000 IN WAR TIME THROUGH RESERVISTS, PROBABLY MORE THAN THAT
Taiwan can probably mobilize at least 450,000 defenders in wartime.
This extreme geography is densely garrisoned by armed defenders. In wartime, Taiwan could mobilize a counter-invasion force of at least 450,000 troops, and probably far more. While Taiwan’s standing military is only around 190,000 strong, it has a large reserve force comprised primarily of recent conscripts with basic training. In 2020, Taiwan’s then defense minister estimated that 260,000 reservists could be mobilized in a worst-case scenario to augment active-duty personnel. This appears to be a conservative estimate.
It would be the first war where both sides have modern long range missiles that can sink ships and destroy land targets with precision at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. There’s never been a war like that before.
[Even with the Ukraine war, Ukraine doesn’t have long range missiles capability though Russia does]
Were it to occur, the battle for Taiwan would involve other complexities that are vital but squishy, meaning they cannot be satisfactorily quantified. It would be the first country-on-country war where both attacker and defender had modern, long range missiles in their arsenals capable of cracking open ships and devastating land targets with precision from hundreds of kilometers away. No one actually knows what such a fight would look like because it’s never happened before.
THE CHINESE INVADING ARMY WOULD NEED A 3 TO 1 RATIO AT LEAST, 1.35 MILLION BUT FOR SUCH UNFAVOURABLE TERRAIN, MORE LIKELY 5 TO 1, OR 2.25 MILION SOLDIERS
Typically commanders want a 3 to 1 superiority over the defender, but 5 to 1 for unfavourable terraing. So the PLA general would want at least 1.35 million men but more likley 2.25 milion for the 5 to 1 ratio
Commanders planning offensive operations typically want a 3-to-1 superiority over the defender. If the terrain is unfavorable, they might want a 5-to-1 ratio (and sometimes more). Assuming Taiwan had 450,000 defenders, the PLA general in charge would therefore want to have at least 1.35 million men, but probably more like 2.25 million. Obviously, this is a simplistic formula. But without access to top secret Chinese military studies and plans, a logical estimate is better than the alternative.
So many men would need an armada of thousands or tens of thousands of ships - tugs, ferries, container carriers, cargo ships and many other types of boat. Many would be decoys to distract attention from the main assault.
If the PLA ground force was a million or more men, then we might expect an armada of thousands or even tens of thousands of ships to deliver them. The vast majority of these ships would not be from the PLA Navy. Vessels like tugs, oilers, barges, ferries, fishing boats, semi-submersible platforms, container carriers, and heavy roll-on/roll-off cargo ships would be mobilized. According to Chinese military doctrine, many ships would be deployed as decoys, conducting feints to distract attention away from the main assault.
Taiwan (unlike Ukraine) has long range missiles already that could hit bases deep within China.
Taiwan’s armed forces, dwarfed by China’s, are in the midst of a modernisation programme to offer a more effective deterrent, including the ability to hit back at bases deep within China in the event of a conflict.
“We hope it is long-range, accurate and mobile,” Chiu said in Parliament, adding that research on such weapons by the state-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology had “never stopped”.
Taiwan says it has begun mass producing long-range missiles
Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops.
American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say.
A Chinese offensive against Taiwan could take many forms, such as a full-scale sea and air assault on the main island with missile barrages, an invasion of small islands closest to China’s southeast coast, a naval blockade or a cyberattack.
. U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China
CHINA ISN’T BUILDING THE SHIPS IT NEEDS - SAM ROGGEVEEN
Here I’ll summarize this article by Sam Roggeveen, Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program, and a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University:
. Why China isn’t planning to storm Taiwan’s beaches
His presentation is in this video
The Chinese could have modernized enough Tank Landing Ships (LST's) to invade Taiwan - they could easily have made vast numbers of them but instead they focus on longer range expeditionary capabilities (Landing platform dock or LPDs).
In this video,
LST = Landing Ship, Tank - Wikipedia (Tank landing ship)
LPD = Landing platform dock = Amphibious transport dock - Wikipedia
China also hasn’t expanded its marines enough for an invasion
Nor is this just a question of ships. China also hasn’t built the Marine forces required to take on a task such as invading Taiwan. In fact, the decision to expand the Marines from 20,000 to 100,000 was only announced in 2017.
Also the amphibious vessels it builds are too large for the Taiwan invasion and they aren’t building enough small ones though they could do so easily.
It is true that China has built larger amphibious vessels, and might be building helicopter carriers similar to Australia’s Canberra class. But the Type 071 class only numbers six vessels, and both it and the mooted Type 075 are bigger than what is needed for a Taiwan scenario, so are probably intended for more distant deployments, such as to the South China Sea.
It seems, then, that China has made a deliberate choice not to build amphibious forces dedicated to retaking Taiwan. Why?
It seems, then, that China has made a deliberate choice not to build amphibious forces dedicated to retaking Taiwan. Why?
His guess is that Chian decided that retaking Taiwan by force would be incredibly costly in lives and resources.
His guess is that Chian decided that retaking Taiwan by force would be incredibly costly in lives and resources.
Instead their aim is to make it difficult for US and its allies to operate near China’s shores.
My guess is that the PLA has decided that, even with a massive amphibious fleet, retaking Taiwan by force would be incredibly costly in lives and resources. Instead, as I discuss in my Centre of Gravity paper, China has made efforts over the past 20 years to improve all aspects of its anti-ship capability, in order to make it increasingly difficult for the US and its allies to operate near China’s shores.
...
My Centre of Gravity paper argues that in modern naval warfare, defence is easier and cheaper than offense. China has used this to its advantage, but if it ever wanted to subdue Taiwan, it would find itself on the other side of that equation.
The fact that China has chosen not to build an amphibious invasion force suggests it has learnt this lesson.
He argues that instead China would try to coerce Taiwan to accede to its demands rather than actually invade.
The risk is that Taiwan resists that coercion and they find themselves in a protracted campaign. But that’s the risk for invasion too.
China also has strong ballitic-missile forces and an air force that far outnumbers Taiwan’s and can match it for quality. These capabilities could be used to coerce Taiwan into meeting Beijing’s demands, rather than physically invading it.
There’s a risk, of course, that Taiwan would resist such coercion and China could find itself in a protracted campaign, but that’s a risk in an invasion scenario too.
My Centre of Gravity paper argues that in modern naval warfare, defence is easier and cheaper than offense. China has used this to its advantage, but if it ever wanted to subdue Taiwan, it would find itself on the other side of that equation.
The fact that China has chosen not to build an amphibious invasion force suggests it has learnt this lesson.
MORE DETAILS ON WHY TAIWAN IS SO HARD FOR CHINA TO INVADE FROM APRIL 2022 ARTICLE BY ALJAZEERA AND 2014 ARTICLE FROM THE DIPLOMAT
This is a good Aljazeera article from April 2022. It has more details than the sources I used.
E.g. they have an airport inside one of their mountains and the planes fly out through tunnels so it wouldn't be so easy for Chian to attack their planes
.
Taiwan has underground hangars for 200 fighter jets in Chiashan Air Force Base and 80 fighter jets in Chihhang.
I can't find photos, but this is an underground hangar from Sweden, hard to attack, easy to protect.
They are also trained to land on and take off from runways if an airport is destroyed.
Background image Bergshangar F 18, År 2006, Wikimedia commons
. How difficult would it be for China to invade Taiwan?
On the other side of the city, buried inside a wet rocky outcropping near the campus of National Taiwan University, lies another tunnel complex, the Air Operations Center.
Known affectionately as “Toad Mountain” by Taiwanese air force officers, this facility oversees one of the most robust air and missile defense networks on the planet. Fed vast quantities of information by airborne early-warning aircraft, long-range radars, listening posts, unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites, Toad Mountain stands constant watch over all of Taiwan’s airspace, ready to scramble fighters or assign surface-to-air missiles to intercept intruders. And, like every other Taiwanese military facility, it has multiple back-ups. Just in case.
One of those back-ups is located on Taiwan’s east coast inside Chiashan or “Optimal Mountain,” not far from the mouth of a gorge cut through pure white marble. Unlike the gorge, however, no tourists are allowed inside this billion dollar bunker complex. According to first-person accounts, the base is an entire military city built inside a hollowed-out mountain. Not only does it have space inside for parking, arming, and repairing over two hundred fighter aircraft, it also has its own hospital and multiple gas stations serving jet fuel. With ten blast doors that exit out to multiple runways via a long taxiway that can itself be used as an emergency runway, it may be toughest airbase ever built.
Ninety miles down the coastline, Taiwan’s air force is further bolstered by the Shihzishan or “Stone Mountain” complex at Chihhang Air Base. Though somewhat smaller than Chiashan, its labyrinthine tunnels can still shelter some eighty aircraft. Both of these facilities benefit from their strategic locations on the far side of the highest mountain range in East Asia. Missiles fired from the Chinese mainland can’t reach them – they would smash into the side of mountains before they got there.
For this reason Taiwan regularly practices dispersing its fighter jets from vulnerable west coast bases to airfields on the east coast. Units are also moved between bases to make it difficult to predict where they might be at any given time, and dummy aircraft are parked on tarmacs and inside shelters to confuse enemy intelligence.
…
The most prominent aspect of China’s strategy is its missile build-up, which aims to intimidate the voters in Taiwan and policymakers in the United States.
Yet without the ability to dominate the air domain, any Chinese attempt to blockade or invade Taiwan would be disastrous. This may explain why China’s amphibious fleet has not grown by a single ship since 2007. It makes little sense for any navy to spend limited resources on ships that could be sunk at the outset of war.
This shows the Taiwanese practicing using a highway as a runway
Taiwan has several hundred jet fighters.
They can land on highways and fly out of fortified hangars in mountains
Taiwan warplanes parked on a highway in exercise to simulate attack of China on their airfields. Image from this article Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained.
And the key to an invasion of Tiawan would be to take the ports because the invasion beaches just couldn't work, there would be no way that China could make enough progress with enough soldiers fast enough to invade Taiwan that way.
So there would be fierce battles by the Chinese to try to take key ports, but in the process they likely damage the ports so much they can't use them anyway.
Meanwhile, China have no combat experience this century while the US has lots of combat experience.
Grey area operations are more possible. This is from a 2014 article from The Diplomat:
QUOTE The challenges in keeping a large mechanised force armed, fed and supplied so it can swiftly seize key objectives and fight successfully through heavily defended and populated urban areas would be huge and next to impossible in any timeframe that would guarantee success. Keeping hundreds of thousands of expeditionary troops combat-effective in the middle of a battlefield would involve a huge supply chain, while possible in peacetime, it would struggle to function in the hostile waters of the Taiwan Strait.
QUOTE These factors, coupled with determined and well-armed allies, the topography of Taiwan itself, the preparedness of its military, and the sheer weight of world opinion that would turn sharply against mainland China if it tried to invade Taiwan make it an unlikely prospect for the present.
QUOTE Blockades of ports and general overflights, grey operations – aggressive actions that stop just short of conflict – conducted by China’s coast guard and general intimidation are more likely prospects if Taiwan were perceived to be moving towards a formal declaration of independence.
QUOTE A military deterrent against any such thoughts by Taiwan’s leadership needs to be plausible, however, and that is exactly what China is working towards.
Here is their short video summary:
See: How difficult would it be for China to invade Taiwan?
ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE MORE DIFFICULT THAN INVADING UKRAINE
To invade Taiwan is orders of magnitude more difficult than invading Ukraine where Russia just needed to drive over the border.
China would need to amass an even larger army, a couple of million, and cross a strait 130 km wide. And then only a few invasion beaches, but Taiwan would deploy its navy (it has a capable navy unlike Ukraine which had none to speak of), including
Capable navy
fast catamarans supplied with anti-ship missiles,
rapid mine sweepers that would protect the invasion beaches,
beaches are overlooked by high cliffs or by earthquake hardened skyscrapers.
Jet fighters hidden in mountains
Trucks with anti-ship missiles isn the forests
It's just beyond credible
.
Nobody has yet tried a sea invasion with 21st century weapons - and China has no combat experience this century, almost none for 50 years.
Beyond credible.
China bluffs, knows it can’t do this.
China: 81 miles (130 km)
- hours of travel to Taiwan
2 million invasion army
30 days warning to Taiwan
14 small invasion beaches overlooked by earthquake hardened skyscrapers and cliffs.Taiwan:
- capable navy
- fast catamarans supplied with anti-ship missiles,
- rapid mine laying to protect invasions beaches,- beaches overlooked by high cliffs or earthquake hardened skyscrapers.
Map: Taiwan
CHINA CAN’T INVADE TAIWAN BY STEALTH - MORE THAN TEN TIMES LARGER NAVAL OPERATION THAN D-DAY
D-Day was the largest amphibious invasion in military history.
According to the D-Day Center, the invasion, officially called "Operation Overlord," combined the forces of 156,115 U.S., British and Canadian troops, 6,939 ships and landing vessels, and 2,395 aircraft and 867 gliders that delivered airborne troops.
. D-Day: Facts on the Epic 1944 Invasion That Changed the Course of WWII
The strait is 81 miles wide - and a destroyer at top speed can do 30 knots or 65 miles per hour. China's fast support ships can do 29 mph so would take nearly 3 hours to cross. The smaller boats that would take the 2.5 million strong invasion army would be much slower and take many hours to cross.
. Type 901 fast combat support ship - Wikipedia
Estimate here: 81 miles is about 120 nautical miles so would take about 10 hours in a boat that can travel at 12 knots.
So they can't invade by stealth. It would be VERY OBVIOUS, build up a huge navy to take 2 million across the strait. Once it started to sail it would take hours to get there. All that time the ships would be vulnerable to the Taiwanese cruise missiles and once they get closer to Taiwan to sea mines then artillery from the shore.
It would be far more difficult and far worse than D-day and unlike D-day there would be no chance of deception, Taiwan would know it's on its way for hours, and they'd see the preparations for it for weeks.
And once they got there they would face an almost impossible task to establish a beach-head on any of the beaches with the defenders firing down on them from earthquake resistant skyscrapers and cliffs, again cruise missiles fired from trucks in the forest, fighter jets flying out of hangars in the mountains.
And all this time China would have to reassure the world that Taiwan is really part of China and that this isn't really a war and that Taiwan really wants China to take over its government.
ESTIMATE OF TIME NEEDED TO TRANSPORT THE SOLDIERS - IF CHINA USED ALL THE CIVILIAN ROLL ON / ROLL OFF FERRIES IN CHINA AND HONG KONG - IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT 8 DAYS TO TRANSPORT THE ENTIRE US ARMY (485,000 MEN) - BUT IT NEEDS FAR MORE THAN THAT FOR A SUCCESSFUL INVASION, ABOUT 2–3 TIMES MINIMUM, MORE LIKELY 3–4 TIMES AS MANY
That’s a rough estimate in a tweet thread from Thomas Stutgard here.
https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1553151810835292162
The 31 Battalion Combat teams is for the Regular Army.
Wikipedia makes that 485,000 men Regular Army (United States) - Wikipedia
Those are updated figures from his article here about how China could use its roll on / off ferries which are designed dual purpose civilian / military:
. Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion - War on the Rocks
A successful invasion would seem to need more than 2 million soldiers
Commanders planning offensive operations typically want a 3-to-1 superiority over the defender. If the terrain is unfavorable, they might want a 5-to-1 ratio (and sometimes more). Assuming Taiwan had 450,000 defenders, the PLA general in charge would therefore want to have at least 1.35 million men, but probably more like 2.25 million. Obviously, this is a simplistic formula. But without access to top secret Chinese military studies and plans, a logical estimate is better than the alternative.
If we take the lower figure of 1.35 million that’s 1.35 million * 8 / 485,000 = 22 days to transport them all across to Taiwan with the roll on / off ferries.
If the PLA ground force was a million or more men, then we might expect an armada of thousands or even tens of thousands of ships to deliver them. The vast majority of these ships would not be from the PLA Navy. Vessels like tugs, oilers, barges, ferries, fishing boats, semi-submersible platforms, container carriers, and heavy roll-on/roll-off cargo ships would be mobilized. According to Chinese military doctrine, many ships would be deployed as decoys, conducting feints to distract attention away from the main assault
Sam Roggeveen argues that China could have built a vast fleet of smaller vessels to attack Taiwan but for some reason they haven’t.
It seems, then, that China has made a deliberate choice not to build amphibious forces dedicated to retaking Taiwan. Why?
…
My Centre of Gravity paper argues that in modern naval warfare, defence is easier and cheaper than offense. China has used this to its advantage, but if it ever wanted to subdue Taiwan, it would find itself on the other side of that equation.
The fact that China has chosen not to build an amphibious invasion force suggests it has learnt this lesson.
About the author
Sam Roggeveen is Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. Before joining the Lowy Institute, Sam was a senior strategic analyst in Australia’s peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments, where his work dealt mainly with North Asian strategic affairs, including nuclear strategy and Asian military forces. Sam also worked on arms control policy in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, and as an analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation.
WHAT ABOUT CAPTURING ONE OF THE SMALLER ISLANDS OR A BLOCKADE? - BOTH ALSO WOULD LEAD TO MAJOR ISSUES FOR CHINA - AND CHINA IS VERY DEPENDENT ON TAIWAN FOR COMPUTER CHIPS - $100+ BILLION TRADE AND MORE IMPORTANTLY - THEY CAN ONLY MAKE MUCH OLDER TECHNOLOGY THEMSELVES, 14 nm INSTEAD OF 7 nm CHIPS
They could try to capture one of the Taiwanese islands near China - but they would have trouble holding onto it becaue Taiwan would surely fight back and has many missiles it could use to attack them.
They could try a blockade of Taiwan but that would hurt themselves too - as they depend on trade from TAiwan.
Taiwan's imports and exports to China in 2020 amounted to $166 Billion and last year was $328.3 billion and of that, $104.3 billion. was computer chips whch mainland China can't make to the same standard. Taiwan is the world leader in computer chip manufacture. And some chips are almost only made in Taiwan.
. china-blocks-some-taiwan-imports-but-avoids-chip-disruption
The $166 billion figure is from here taiwan.gov.tw/content_6
The Taiwanese company TSMC manufactures Apple’s A-series and M-series chips and has over 50% of the world’s semiconductor foundry market.
. Pelosi’s Taiwan trip puts the world's biggest chipmaker back in the spotlight of U.S.-China rivalry
The SMIC chip maker in China can only make 14 nm scale chips - that's the resolution of the smallest components. Taiwan and other manufactuerrs can make them down to 7 nm which means they can make modern much faster much more densely packed chips.
China is years behind Taiwan in chip manufacture.
, China's biggest chipmaker is still years behind its global rivals
Russia's blockade of Ukraine caused problems for countries that rely on very low cost wheat.
Any attempt by China to blockade Taiwan would cause problems for countries that depend on computer chips - including China itself. So it's not something that China could do easily. When they sanctioned Taiwan for Pelosi's visit they didn't include chips.
. china-blocks-some-taiwan-imports-but-avoids-chip-disruption
Unlike the full scale invasion, it is militarily feasible for China to do a blockade without a million or more soldiers and many weeks of preparation or more - but politically and economically it would be very difficult.
As for capturing an island, again it is militarily feasible though not easy - but then they would potentially be under constant attack from Taiwan after they capture it, by missiles. They might do it hoping Taiwan doesn’t attack, or capture an island just to make a point and then surrender it back.
What they can do are gray area things like they are doing now.
WHAT DID AVRIL HAINES SAY? NOTHING NEW
It's at 9:30 here:
(U.S. Believes Russia Preparing for Prolonged Conflict in Ukraine)
QUOTE The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer competitor in areas of relevance to national security, is pushing to revise global norms and institutions to its advantage. And it is challenging the united states in multiple arenas. Economically, militarily and technologically. China is especially effective at bringing together a coordinated, whole of government approach to demonstrated strength and to compel neighbours to acquiesce to its preferences. Including its territorial and maritime claims, and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.
And a key area of focus for the IC us president Xi jinking's determination to force unification with Taiwan on Beijing's terms. China would prefer to force unification that avoids armed conflict, and it has been stepping up diplomatic, economic and military pressure on the island. For years. To isolate it and weaken confidence in its democratically elected leaders. At the same time, Beijing is prepared to use military force if it decides this is necessary.
So she is saying that China wants to force Taiwan to be part of China, and that they prefer to avoid armed conflict, but is prepared to use military force if it decides this is necessary. This is not news.
QUOTE The PRC is also engaged in the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history.
[There it is still far far less than the US nuclear weapons or the Russian and it's not clear how much of it is real or just dummy missiles to fool attackers].
There is nothing here new.
From the CIA chief Burns:
“I think the Chinese leadership is looking very carefully at all this — at the costs and consequences of any effort to use force to gain control over Taiwan,” Burns said.
. Chinese calculations on Taiwan affected by Ukraine conflict, says CIA director
USA CONSTANTLY OVERESTIMATES CHINESE PLANS FOR NUKES .
In this graphic the red dots are the US estimates of how many nukes China is going to have in the future at various dates, the blue dots are the numbers they actually had. You see very clearly how the US intelligence consistently overestimates by a HUGE margin and they don't seem to learn they keep doing it
In reality China just aren't that interested in stockpiling nukes. Not like Russia and the US. They don't think there is a significant risk of an adversary trying to invade and conquer China and so they don't see a need for a major nuclear deterrent. They even keep the nukes separate from the missiles.
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CHINA POWER PROJECT - CHINA MAINTAINS NUKES AT A LOW ALERT LEVEL AND HAS NUCLEAR MATERIAL ENOUGH FOR ONLY A FEW HUNDRED NUKES
China’s nuclear strategy centers on deterrence through “assured retaliation,” which is the ability to survive an initial attack and retaliate with nuclear strikes that inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. In accordance with this strategy, a key feature of China’s nuclear posture is that it maintains a low alert level. Unlike US and Russian forces, which keep many of their nuclear weapons on high alert, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stores its warheads separately from missiles until they are paired in preparation for a retaliatory strike.
Consistent with its defensive posture, China has maintained a no first use (NFU) policy since it detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964. China’s NFU pledge commits Beijing to only employ its nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack by another country. The 2006 Defense White Paper reiterates Beijing’s long-held position that China will not use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or in “nuclear-weapon-free zones.” It also declares that China will not enter an arms race.
…
Though they haven’t done so yet, it’s possible China could change to a launch on warning system like other countries.
As China’s nuclear capabilities improve, there is increased speculation that Beijing will adopt a more offensive nuclear posture. The 2019 DoD report on China’s military notes that Beijing may develop the capability to “launch on warning” of an incoming nuclear attack. Such a shift would require heightened readiness, advanced surveillance capabilities, and rapid response. It would also mark a watershed moment for the PLA and suggest that Beijing may move toward a more offensive nuclear force posture and abandon its NFU policy.
However a Chinese Foreign Ministry official in 2019 called on all countries to abandon the policy of launch on warning - this came shortly after announcement that Russia was helping China to develop a missile attack warning system.
The likelihood of China adopting a launch on warning posture remains uncertain. During an arms control conference in October 2019, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official issued an unprecedented call for all countries to abandon the policy of preparing to launch nuclear weapons on warning of an impending nuclear strike. However, this statement came shortly after Russia announced it is assisting China with the development of a missile attack warning system – a prerequisite for maintaining a launch on warning posture.
China only has enough weapons grade fissile material to make a few hundred warheads
Despite the expectation that China will increase its nuclear weapons inventory, some factors may inhibit Beijing from substantially building up its nuclear arsenal. Chief among these is China’s relatively small reserve of weapons-grade fissile material, which is needed for nuclear detonations.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that China’s fissile material stockpile stands at 14 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 2.9 metric tons of plutonium – enough to produce only a few hundred warheads. This pales in comparison to Russian and US reserves and is even smaller than the amount held by France and the United Kingdom.
It could ramp up fast but at a cost to its civilian nuclear program
Beijing also has the technological capacity and resources to quickly ramp up its supplies of HEU, and could have the capacity to increase supplies of weapons-grade plutonium. Doing so, however, could come at a cost to China’s civilian nuclear energy program, and would signal Beijing’s intent to move to a more offensive nuclear posture.
. How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces? | ChinaPower Project
China don’t have tactical nukes. They have huge multi-megaton strategic nukes. These would be of absolutely no use in a war with Taiwan.
Also with their strong focus on soft power and the image of China abroad, that also stands against any use of nukes.
Meanwhile the USA is not talking about using nukes against China either, it wouldn’t make sense. They would supply weapons to Taiwan, intelligence as for Ukraine, they would surely be very cautious just as they are in the Ukraine war. They might get involved in conventional way with their fighter jets, submarines etc but the USA are very cautious about military involvement
QUICK BACKGROUND HISTORY FOR TAIWAN - TAIWAN IS WHERE THE FORMER CHINESE GOVERNMENT RETREATED AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND FOR A LONG TIME BOTH CLAIMED TO BE THE RIGHTFUL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA - REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN WAS FIRST TAIWAN - AND THEN THE COMMUNISTS
The history here is that the former government of China retreated to Taiwan when it was defeated in the cultural revolution. For a long time it maintained the fiction that it was still the government of China. The UN recognized Taiwan rather than the communist PLA as the governmetn of China.
Then the UN changed their policy and accepted that China was indeed ruled by the communists. But that then left Taiwan in the limbo because it continued to claim it represented China. The UN only accepts one government as representative of every member country.
CHINA’S “ONE CHINA” POLICY - CLAIMS TO REPRESENT BOTH COUNTRIES AT THE UN - LEAVING TAIWAN WITH NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION
Since then China has claimed to represent both China and Taiwan under the one China two governments policy.
Taiwan was basically waiting for the Chinese communist party to fail, for China to collapse and then accept Taiwan as the rightful government.
Meanwhile China is waiting for the Taiwanese government to collapse similarly and become communist.
Neither of these are realistic expectations.
THE PAN-GREEN PARTY WANTS TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE, PAN-BLUE IN TAIWAN IS WAITING FOR CHINA TO BECOME A DEMOCRACY AND JOIN WITH TAIWAN, COMMUNIST CHINA IS WAITING FOR TAIWAN TO BECOME COMMUNIST AND JOIN WITH COMMUNIST CHINA - NONE OF THESE SEEM REALISTIC HOPES AT PRESENT
Meanwhile many modern Taiwanese no longer want to rule China but want to be an independent country. So we have
China need to keep threatening to invade because they claim to their own people that Taiwan is part of China and is ruled by a corrupt elite that would quickly lose power if they were to invade. But they themselves know it is really a democracy and that there is almost nobody in Taiwan supports the People's Republic of China.
The two main political divisions in Taiwan are
the Pan-Blue parties want eventual reunification with China but under a democratic government based on Taiwan's government, expecting eventual collapse of the communist party in China.
the Pan-Green parties want Taiwanese independence.
Only some very small parties want a PRC governing Taiwan.
China has no real appetite for a war that would kill mainy Chinese in both Taiwan and the invading army and possibly in mainland China too if Taiwan retaliated - Taiwan is developing the ability to hit targets in mainland China.
They will just keep bluffing like they have for decades, for decades more, and in the hope that eventually a pro PRC party arises in Taiwan- while the Pan-Blue party in Taiwan will keep hoping for the Chinese communist party to collapse and China to become a democracy. The Pan-Green hope to gradually ease towards independence - and all of them for now want to continue the status quo.
USA “ACKNOWLEDGES” CHINA’S CLAIMS TO TAIWAN UNDER ITS COMMITMENT TO THE “ONE CHINA” POLICY BUT DOESN’T “RECOGNIZE” CHINA’S CLAIMS
Biden as president of the USA is committed to the "one China policy". His personal views are irrelevant and he wouldn't say what they are as it's not up for negotiation. As president he is head of the executive and he has a lot of flexibility in foreign policy but he is bound by past US decisions his job is to implement them so he has to implement this.
He is different from Trump. Trump just could say almost anything and get away with it because he knew so little about foreign policy, but Biden if he talks and goes just a few cms out of line it becomes a headline story because of his character and his long history in the legislature, as vice president and long familiarity with foreign policy.
But the US official policy didn't change under Trump.
It is a compromise where the US has formal ties with China, and only acknowledges China's position that Taiwan is part of China and doesn't recognize it. China wanted the US to change the world "acknowledge" to "recognize" but the USA refuses.
Meanwhile the US maintains strong unofficial ties with Taiwan. Politically the USA is far closer to Taiwan as a democracy than to China. The background here is that Taiwan originally claimed to represent all of China - but once the communists took over China after the revolution, then the US for a long time continued to recognize Taiwan as representing China. So when they changed to officially recognizing China it left Taiwan in a limbo. Nowadays there are many in Taiwan who would be fine with just being recognized as an independent country independent from China but others would still want to be recognized as the rightful government of mainland China.
So it is politically complex because of that history. If the USA recognized Taiwan they'd be implying that the government of China is illegitimate and should be ruled by Taiwan. Meanwhile China also wants Taiwan to be part of China and aren't keen on an independent Taiwan, which seems the obvious solution to outsiders 🙂. So -they likely continue in this limbo indefinitely, it's not at all likely that Taiwan chooses voluntarily to join China and not credible that China invades Taiwan because it is so difficult to invade. China is playing a long game trying to put pressure on Taiwan and hoping that eventually maybe decades from now Taiwan decides to be part of China but there are only a very few minority view politicians in Taiwan with that view.
US Recognizes and has formal ties with China rather than Taiwan but US doesn’t endorse China’s principle that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China to be reunified one day - BBC summary
It is the diplomatic acknowledgement of China's position that there is only one Chinese government. Under the policy, the US recognises and has formal ties with China rather than the island of Taiwan, which China sees as a breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland one day.
The One China policy is a key cornerstone of Sino-US relations. It is also a fundamental bedrock of Chinese policy-making and diplomacy. However, it is distinct from the One China principle, whereby China insists Taiwan is an inalienable part of one China to be reunified one day.
The US policy is not an endorsement of Beijing's position and indeed as part of the policy, Washington maintains a "robust unofficial" relationship with Taiwan, including continued arms sales to the island so that it can defend itself.
Although Taiwan's government claims it is an independent country officially called the "Republic of China", any country that wants diplomatic relations with mainland China must break official ties with Taipei.
This has resulted in Taiwan's diplomatic isolation from the international community.
=================
MORE DETAILED FROM CSIS
A1: When the United States moved to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and de-recognize the Republic of China (ROC) in 1979, the United States stated that the government of the People’s Republic of China was “the sole legal Government of China.” Sole, meaning the PRC was and is the only China, with no consideration of the ROC as a separate sovereign entity.
The United States did not, however, give in to Chinese demands that it recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan (which is the name preferred by the United States since it opted to de-recognize the ROC). Instead, Washington acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan was part of China. For geopolitical reasons, both the United States and the PRC were willing to go forward with diplomatic recognition despite their differences on this matter. When China attempted to change the Chinese text from the original acknowledge to recognize, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher told a Senate hearing questioner, “[W]e regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word ‘acknowledge’ as being the word that is determinative for the U.S.” In the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China Communique, the United States went one step further, stating that it had no intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
To this day, the U.S. “one China” position stands: the United States recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China but only acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. Thus, the United States maintains formal relations with the PRC and has unofficial relations with Taiwan. The “one China” policy has subsequently been reaffirmed by every new incoming U.S. administration. The existence of this understanding has enabled the preservation of stability in the Taiwan Strait, allowing both Taiwan and mainland China to pursue their extraordinary political and socioeconomic transitions in relative peace.
(What Is the U.S. “One China” Policy, and Why Does it Matter?)
I go into more of the background here: Why China won’t invade Taiwan
CHINA’S SOFT POWER
China has a very strong focus on “soft power” which is all about improving China’s image in the rest of the world. “Soft Power” was coined by Joseph Nye and originally applied it to the USA. Idea that as the USA lost its military power at the end of the cold war - that it can gain in “soft power” with an attractive culture with attractive values that extend it’s influence in the world.
China has taken this term and extended it to mean much more than the original idea.
QUOTE So there’s all these grand events that are happening in the world, but the end of the Cold War has motivated his writing because some historians were arguing at the time that the U.S. power overall is declining, right? So Joseph Nye came in and said, well, I don’t think so. We can actually gain a lot through soft power, which is the power of attraction. Not only military power, but soft power is something that really distinguishes U.S. for many other nations.
But you mentioned that this term is quite narrow but at the same time, it’s pretty broad, right? Attraction is such a subjective thing. What does it really mean to have attractive values, to have attractive culture?
Kaiser: Sure.
Maria: And can be answered in a variety of ways. So, because it was so ambiguous in some ways, but also because it defined kind of in some ways the powers of the U.S., it got really quickly adapted by other countries. Turkey, Iran, Russia have been using and deploying, rethinking this term.
So starting in the mid 2000s China became an enthusiastic adopter of the idea.
But China has been one of the most enthusiastic adapters of the term soft power starting in mid-2000s. We see a lot of articles coming out, just thousands and thousands, which took me a while to sift through and find kind of the more representative ones on what soft power is. A lot of policy debates about soft power.
Maria: So I think there are two differences I want to point out.
But the Chinese idea is far broader, - Chinese scholars include almost anything that bolsters China’s image.
One difference is that Chinese idea of soft power I think overall it’s just much broader. It’s broader, more expansive than Nye’s. So that’s just the overarching difference. So that’s kind of the big distinction, but what specifically is it broader on in terms of resources and motivation? So one is that the resources of soft power, the way the Chinese government sees it and Chinese scholars, they can include almost anything that bolsters China’s image.
So it’s not necessarily just culture values and foreign policy, but also China’s technological innovation, economic governance, political, capacity building and mobilization, and many other things, right? So culture is emphasized as kind of the core feature, but culture itself is also ambiguous. It includes traditional culture, values, ideology in it. So culture itself is an all encompassing very fluid concept.
And then in addition to that many argue that there are other ways to think about soft power, specifically focusing on politics and economics as the key kind of additional features or facets of advertising or promoting Chinese image.
So that’s kind of one big, big distinction in terms of Nye who focuses on culture values and foreign policy, and Chinese scholars who see almost anything that helps bolster China’s rise, Chinese images, potentially part of soft power,
. China's soft power collides with Russia’s war on Ukraine – SupChina
Anyway - whatever it means - China wants more of it.
But Russia doesn’t seem to care. Putin has lost a lot of influence in the world by the invasion, whatever “soft power” Russia had is just about gone. But Russia has been much more focused on overt coercion and manipulation and much less on soft power.
So - for China looking at the effect of the Ukraine invasion on Russian soft power that is another big disincentive. It’s not so much the sanctions. The rest of the world depends on China a fair bit. They can configure to not use its products as they had to do during the lockdown. China certainly doesn’t want the sanctions that would come with a war with Taiwan.
But for sure and doubly so they don’t want the hit on China’s image. All the relationships its carefully built up with multiple countries - all destroyed in a few weeks if they are ostracised in the way Russia is now.