Putin's invasion of Ukraine was NOT an emotional decision - likely nearly a year to plan - carefully calculated based on rosy-tinted information from spies - a risk averse man who needs 100% certainty

Summarizing research by RUSI, ISW etc - fact checking an UNSUPPORTED claim aired on the BBC

For a first impression take a look at the graphics and read the section titles - then drill into any section of interest. You can also browse section titles with the menu that shows up if you click on the short horizontal lines to the left of this page.

I strongly recommend scared people don’t watch much or any news right now.

This was a SERIOUSLY MISLEADING BBC News segment in their regular news program - later made into a news article. It features UNSUPPORTED speculation by one interviewee, and never mentions the EXTENSIVE RESEARCH by RUSI, ISW etc. which shows that Putin decided to invade Ukraine long in advance and the peace talks were just a sham or charade.

You can see that they don't really believe what they say because why would they spend half the news on Jeremy Clarkson talking about farmers' inheritance tax if they really believed this story? They would be telling us all what to do to save millions of lives if nukes struck, as they did during the cold war when I was a child. Anyone in their 70s or older remembers at least part of those instructions but we don’t need to know today.

They saw the farmer's inheritance tax as far more important. It is more important for people in the UK of course but the reason it's important is because we have NO RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

So just from that you can see that they do NOT believe that there is a risk

.

TEXT ON GRAPHIC

The reason farmers' inheritance tax is the big story today taking half the news segment is because we have NO RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

Jeremy Clarkson: "Do you know how many people pay inheritance tax in this country?"

Putin does NOT act on his emotions despite what the BBC interviewee said.

He decided to invade Ukraine a YEAR earlier in March 2021.

He seemed to make a last minute decision just because he was playing games with Macron and the others trying to find peace.

We now know his nearly 200,000 strong army was just a distraction for is plan A.

He was going to

- take over Hostomel airport with paratroopers in helicopters.

- send in heavy transport aircraft

all on day 1.

They would take over the Kyiv government on day 2.

Then with the help of the Ukrainian military they would take over all of Ukraine in 10 days.

He genuinely believed that the Ukrainians were oppressed by a Nazi Jew of all things and would welcome the Russian liberators.

He believed the rosy pictures of his spies over Western media.

He expected the Ukrainian military to desert en masse and join the Russian military to help with mopping up any resistance.

He thought this was 100% risk free and had no plan B.

These are the plans of a CAREFUL CALCULATING but MISINFORMED man. NOT SOMEONE WHO ACTS ON EMOTIONAL IMPULSES. We see this frequently in the war, very risk averse and very slow to make decisions, 2 months to decide what to do about the Ukrainians controlling part of Russia's Kursk oblast - far too late.

I will give the fact check later but first, what the BBC said and to help scared people I will summarize what they got wrong first, as comments in CAPS, then go into detail.

This is a transcript of the BBC segment:

TRANSCRIPT
[BBC Journalist Steve Rosenberg]:

President Putin had promised changes to the nuclear doctrine weeks ago, a clear signal to Europe and America not to let Ukraine strike Russia with long-range missiles.
[Pentagon, when asked about this doctrine change, says “we don't have any indications that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon within Ukraine”]

Then, an even clearer signal, Russian nuclear exercises. A warning to the West not to cross Russia’s red lines.
[NUCLEAR EXERCISES ARE VERY COMMON FOR BOTH RUSSIA AND THE USA]

But the key question, in Russia’s war on Ukraine, would Vladmir Putin use a nuclear weapon.

[Novaya Gazeta columnist Andrei Kolesnikov]:
I think it is quite serious. Because
even Putin doesn't know if he can use nukes or he can't
[UNSUPPORTED – Pentagon sees no evidence of preparing to use nukes].

It depends on his emotions
[UNSUPPORTED – see next claim].

We know that he's a very emotional man
[UNSUPPORTED - WE KNOW HE IS A VERY RISK AVERSE AND CALCULATING MAN, source ISW]

and the decision to begin this war was also an emotional step
[UNSUPPORTED - CAREFULLY CALCULATED LONG IN ADVANCE, sources RUSI and ISW]

END OF TRANSCRIPT

recording of the segment uploaded here just to assist with verifying the transcription

The unsupported conclusion that Putin could impulsively use a nuke as an emotional decision goes against what the Pentagon say, that they see no signs of any preparation to use nukes. They also see no changes that need to be made in their own nuclear defence posture [alert level] as a result of the change of doctrine.

See section below: Sabrina Singh, Pentagon spokesperson says they see NO PREPARATION TO USE NUKES and they have not raised their own response level

The unsupported claim that Putin invaded Ukraine as an emotional decision goes against extensive reliable sources such as the Institute for the Study of War, and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) assessment

See section below: Putin’s invasion based on what he thought was a certainty that he could take over Ukraine in 10 days - so certain he never devised a “plan B” - and a decision made nearly a year before the invasion

The ISW concludes that he is a very risk averse man, not that he acts out of emotions.

See section below: These are the actions of a risk averse calculating man

As we will see, Putin did NOT make an emotional decision. His problem is that as an ex spy he believed his spies and he didn't consult with his generals.

We now know that the peace talks with Macron and Biden and others were all a charade and sham. He had already decided to invade Ukraine and all that was just to distract from his real intentions. So it wasn't a sudden emotional decision as he pretended it was. He just lied for months to the Western leaders about his plans. This is well established, there is a huge amount of research into this over the last 2 years as you can imagine.

He thought he had a 100% safe risk free way to take over Ukraine in 10 days and that is the only reason he did it.

If the BBC asked the Pentagon spokesperson a question in her regular press briefings every day - or interviewed the ISW - or RUSI, or anyone reliable they would tell them all these things.

Instead Steve Rosenberg interviewed a Russian columnist who seems to know nothing about this research. That is Steve Rosenberg’s sole source.

Steve Rosenberg has now written this up as a news story, which still only presents this FALSE claim that Putin invaded Ukraine as an emotional decision at the last minute, without any attempt at a fact check of what the mistaken columnist said or the use of any other sources on the topic, just that Russian columnist.

His story concludes:

Because of that we must take seriously his idea of the changing of the nuclear doctrine. They say the fear of war must return and will contain both sides, but this is also a tool of escalation.

[NO WE DO NOT HAVE TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY, THE WHITE HOUSE SAY “It's the same irresponsible rhetoric that we've seen before and that we've seen frankly for the past two years”]

“In this interpretation we must admit that Putin, under some circumstances, can use at least a tactical nuclear weapon in the framework of a limited nuclear war. It will not solve the problem. But it will be the start of a suicidal escalation for the whole world.”

[NO WE MUST NOT - THE PENTAGON SEE NO SIGNS OF ANY PREPARATION TO USE NUKES OR ANY CHANGE IN RUSSIA’S POSTURE AND NO NEED TO CHANGE THEIR OWN RESPONSE LEVEL]

. Steve Rosenberg: After days of escalation, what will Putin do next?

See section below: Sabrina Singh, Pentagon spokesperson says they see NO PREPARATION TO USE NUKES and they have not raised their own response level

From the extensive research we now have, it is the other way around. It is clear that if Putin's spies had told him the truth in July 2021

• that the Ukrainians would resist strongly rather than welcome the invasion,

and if Putin's team had done red teaming,

• military planning challenging their assumptions instead of just optimistically

  assuming everything would go well

that he would NOT have invaded Ukraine.

But he doesn’t need this for any thoughts he might ever have about really attacking NATO. He already knows that attacking NATO is a reckless thing for Russia to do with 0% chance of successe. Putin has always recognized that NATO is very strong, there’s a reason why he invaded Ukraine rather than the much weaker Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia which don’t have a single tank or fighter jet between them. What they do have is that they are part of NATO. See my separate blog post:

He also knows that a nuclear war cannot be won. There is no way that rosy tinted information from spies could persuade him otherwise.

See section: Everyone agrees that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought - not as a treaty - just agreeing on a self evident truth

See also my:

So now to unpack all this in more detail:

Putin’s invasion based on what he thought was a certainty that he could take over Ukraine in 10 days - so certain he never devised a “plan B” - and a decision made nearly a year before the invasion

This is based on a summary by the Imperial War Museum based on the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) assessment which in turn is based on secret information that can’t be revealed for operational security reasons

. I start with my summary of a longer quote from them.

He thought he had a

• 100% certain way to take over the Kyiv government in 2 days and

• all of Ukraine in 10 days.

His plan was to use the invading soldiers as a distraction while he

• day 1 (24th) a small group of elite paratroopers lands in Hostomel airport to take over the airport and set up an air-bridge. He then sends heavy equipment via military transport planes, all of this on day 1

• day 2 (25th) they set off from Hostomel airport and drive into Kyiv. He believed from mistaken reports that the people of Kyiv were oppressed and wouldn't oppose his soldiers and that he would quickly take over the government and capture or kill Zelensky or he'd flee.

• They would then set up a puppet government

• days 3 to 10, takes over all of Ukraine and the military then acts as a temporary administration for Ukraine.

It was NOT an emotional last minute decision. He knew he was going to do it long before.

It seemed like a last minute decision because of the way he promised peace to Macron and to Biden and others right up to the day of the invasion. But he didn't suddenly change his mind. He knew he was going to invade already and was just playing a game with them.

That summarizes this more detailed account by the Imperial War Museum of what RUSI found out:

QUOTE STARTS

According to research by the think tank RUSI, when Vladimir Putin began his invasion, he expected to take control of Ukraine within ten days. So what went wrong? Why did his plan fail? And how close did he come to succeeding?

Well, to find out, we first need to take a closer look at Putin's plan.

The Russian invasion plan was based on a number of assumptions. Russia's President Vladimir Putin believed that Ukraine and Russia were 'one people'. And that, freed of their supposedly Nazi leader in Volodymyr Zelensky, the apathetic people of Ukraine would willingly align with Russia. Essentially, he did not believe that they would put up a fight.

So, instead of a conventional invasion led by the military, Putin planned for what he termed a Special Military Operation led by the Russian Security Services or the FSB. To avoid Western sanctions, they planned to complete the operation as quickly as possible, using infiltrated groups to neutralise Zelensky and the Ukrainian political leadership, before setting up a more friendly regime.

Conventional military forces were only a supporting element of the operation. They were to fix the majority of the Ukrainian army in the Donbas, while advancing quickly on the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. They wanted to give the impression of a rapid envelopment and help facilitate that collapse of Ukrainian political power. After 10 days, the conventional forces would switch to an administrative role, supporting the FSB in controlling the Ukrainian population.

Ed Arnold: "The issue with a special service making the plan and not the military is that you actually miss a lot of the key professional military interjectors needed to make a coherent military plan. What's also come to the fore now, and is very obvious is that there was no plan B. As soon as their plan A failed, they just could not switch to a plan B because they didn't have one."

Ukraine's military on the other hand was fully prepared for the invasion. While they were a substandard force, in 2014 when the War in Ukraine began, a top to bottom review meant that by 2022, the Ukrainians had become an effective fighting force. With Western assistance, they modernised their artillery, becoming Europe's 2nd largest artillery force after Russia. They overhauled their air defence, with better targeting and more mobile SAMs, and in January 2022, they created a new territorial defence force.

Ed Arnold: "They'd been fighting in the Donbass since the operation in 2014 and they cycled units through. So actually there was a lot of experience within the wider professional Ukrainian military. It was very key in the first 3 to 5 to 10 days to be able to hold back Russian forces to allow these newly mobilised recruits to be equipped and to be put into defensive areas where they could actually have an effect."

...

Only when it became clear that Kyiv was the main Russian target some 7 hours before the invasion, were Ukrainian forces ordered to redeploy. As such, they would have to meet the Russian invasion without prepared defensive positions. Achieving surprise like this was a key objective of the Russian plan, however it came at a cost.

Ed Arnold: "The Russians were so concerned about the plan getting out and Ukraine being able to prepare, that they actually didn't tell their soldiers. If you don't tell soldiers what they're about to do, they can't achieve their objective. There were actually some soldiers who thought they were there on an exercise. They didn't actually even believe that there was a military operation taking place.

So that inability to allow your soldiers to prepare for what you are going to do means that they just there's no chance that they're going to be able to carry out their task."

While the Russian army had surprised the Ukrainian army at an operational level, the Russian soldiers were completely unprepared at a tactical level and faced Ukrainian soldiers who were psychologically ready for the fight. The question was, could Ukraine last long enough to mobilise its reserves and garner much needed western support.

...

On February 4th, Russian aircraft and missiles struck a raft of targets throughout Ukraine and successfully disrupted Ukrainian command and control.... However, Ukraine's ammunition, aircraft and air defences had been successfully dispersed before the attack and were largely untouched. They would be able to recover.

...

Initial assaults on Sumy and Kharkiv failed with heavy casualties, forcing the Russians to bypass the cities.

And at Hostomel, a crucial part of the Russian plan went disastrously wrong.

Two waves of 10 helicopters flew low along the Dnipro River to capture the vital airport just north of Kyiv. The airborne forces successfully took Hostomel but came under sustained Ukrainian artillery fire and were forced out by a counterattack.

Ed Arnold: "Well, the Russian plan really relied on taking Hostomel so that they could bring in heavier transport aircraft from mechanized forces and get into Kyiv much quicker. And when that was no longer an option, they had to move on a land move south from Belarus, and they created this 40-mile-long convoy, which effectively became static because it got bogged down in some of the terrain, it ran out of fuel, ran out of food, ran out of batteries even. And actually, became a target for Ukrainian special forces on the ground."

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-Putin-lost-in-10-days

RUSI Summary based on secret documents the authors can’t yet make public

We can also go to the RUSI assessment itself to find more details. This is written by authors with access to secret material in the possession of the Ukrainian military which they couldn’t release for operational security reasons.

TEXT ON GRAPHIC

Russia’s military exercises in spring 2021

We now know that Putin and his spies had ALREADY decided to invade Ukraine

Objectives were:
— pressure the West to encourage Kyiv to make more concessions
— preposition military assets for the invasion in 2022
— assess reactions of Ukraine’s international partners to invasion preparations

Based on RUSI analysis [Royal United Service Institute]

Photograph from: Russia’s Zapad-21: Lessons Learned

The 2021 military scenario was a defensive one, and even the soldiers didn’t know the real intention.

You can get a quick overview of this section by just reading my summaries before the longer quotes.

RUSI say that the plan was to take over the whole of Ukraine in 10 days and annex it by August 2022.

Russia planned to start by capturing Kyiv and used deception to keep most of the Ukrainian forces well away from the capital. They had the advantage of a 12 : 1 ratio of forces north of Kyiv. However they weren’t able to use this advantage to take the capital because they

• kept the plan so secret the Russian forces weren’t prepared to carry out the plan effectively

• hadn’t put any plans in place to retreat out of situations in response to setbacks [no plan B]

I have just edited the text here to insert extra bullet points, no rephrasing.

QUOTE STARTS

Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital.

The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action [ways to retreat out of a situation].

As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 1)

The plan was formulated by Russia’s special services and a core group in the presidential administration. It was supported by senior Ministry of Defence officials.

RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE in its invasion of Ukraine was the subjugation of the Ukrainian state. This plan was formulated first and foremost by Russia’s special services and a core group within the presidential administration, supported by senior officials in the Ministry of Defence.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 7)

RUSI say the plans go back to the exercises of March 2021 which were intended to test how the West would respond to the first stages of a real invasion.

Russia’s military build-up against Ukraine began in March 2021 when large numbers of conventional troops were added to existing forces along Ukraine’s borders. This build-up performed three functions.

• First, it put pressure on Western governments to re-engage in the Minsk II negotiations to encourage Kyiv to make concessions and thereby avert a conflict.

• Second, it pre-positioned military equipment around Ukraine that would allow for a more rapid build-up of forces when the time came for the invasion.

• Third, it provided an opportunity for Moscow to assess the reaction of Ukraine’s international partners.

Ukraine’s international partners dismissed the threat in spring 2021 because they did not observe the necessary enablers deployed with the Russian formations nor the necessary political shaping of the information environment in Russia to support an invasion. They were correct on both counts – the build-up turned out to be a mobilisation exercise.

However, the lesson for the Kremlin was that

• the enablers could be brought to the formations faster than Ukraine’s partners could bring military capabilities:

• if these were the indicators that would cause international partners to react, they would do so too late.

The Kremlin’s confidence that it could invade Ukraine without significant international interference was an important reason for undertaking the full-scale invasion.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 7)

Then the FSB did extensive surveys in Ukraine which painted a picture of a population that would respond apathetically and favourably to an invasion.

In July 2021, the 9th Section of the 5th Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) was enlarged into a directorate and tasked with planning for the occupation of Ukraine.

As part of this preparation, the FSB drew on extensive surveys carried out in Ukraine. These surveys painted a picture of

• a largely politically apathetic Ukrainian society that distrusted its leaders,

• was primarily concerned about the economy and

• thought an escalation of the war between Russia and Ukraine was unlikely.

Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally articulated in an essay in July 2021 his belief that

• the people of Ukraine viewed Russians favourably and

• believed they were part of a shared civilisation, cruelly divided by historical political mistakes.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : pages 7-8)

Putin believed that if he could eliminate the government in Kyiv quickly the population would quickly turn to support the Russians. General Gerasimov assured Putin that Russia’s military was able to do this.

The barrier, in his [Putin’s] view, to correcting these mistakes was

• the government in Kyiv, which he accused of being a puppet to external powers hostile to Russia.

The Russian military leadership was also

• confident that it would defeat the UAF after more than a decade of modernisation.

Assurances from General Valery Gerasimov on Russia’s military capabilities played a key role in shaping the confidence of Russia’s special services in their plan. As Gerasimov told international interlocutors on the outbreak of the war,

• ‘I command the second most powerful Army in the world’. Separately Gerasimov told British counterparts that Russia had achieved conventional military parity with the US

The conception of the Russian invasion therefore was developed around several key assumptions:

• Speed was critical to success to render the response of the international community irrelevant.

• The removal of Ukraine’s leaders would remove the barrier for pro-Russian Ukrainians to vocalise support for the occupation.

• Controlling heating, electricity and finance would be an effective means of controlling the apathetic majority of the Ukrainian population.

• The Russian military could defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield.

From these assumptions, the FSB, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Gerasimov and elements within the presidential administration developed their plan to achieve Putin’s strategic goal.

The key military-strategic tasks for the Russian military and security forces were to:

• Degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend itself by destroying its air, maritime and air-defence forces.

• Defeat Ukrainian Ground Forces by fixing them in Donbas.

• Diffuse Ukraine’s will and capacity to resist by eliminating Ukraine’s political and military leadership and occupying critical centres of political and economic power.

• Deceive the Ukrainian government as to the time, location, scope and scale of Russia’s invasion.

There was a tension in this plan between the aim of diffusing Ukraine’s political unity and deceiving Ukraine as to the intent. The former would have required a sustained shaping phase preceding the invasion. The latter demanded speed. It appears that Russian planners succumbed to optimism bias as to the dislocating effect that speed itself could achieve in diffusing Ukraine’s will to resist and therefore opted to undertake a shock and awe campaign with little preliminary shaping

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : pages 7-8)

Only a small group of officials knew about these plans. Also, many of those officials only knew part of the plan and not the whole plan.

This small pool of people contributed to the range of false assumptions they shared and didn’t challenge

These plans were drawn up by a very small group of officials and the intent was directed by Putin.

Many officials executing elements of the preparation were unaware of the wider intent.

Russian military personnel – even up to deputy heads of branches within the Russian General Staff –were unaware of the intention to invade and occupy Ukraine until days before the invasion, and tactical military units did not receive orders until hours before they entered Ukraine.

While this helped to achieve operational surprise – which was no doubt the intent – the tiny pool of personnel involved contributed to a range of false assumptions that appear never to have been challenged.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 12)

The Russians

• don’t seem to have done any independent red teaming

[There red teaming means war gaming with a group that pretends to be the enemy, and more generally looking at the plans with a creative independent group that does out of the box thinking, challenging of assumptions behind their plans and what could go wrong. See The concept of red teaming in corps' warfighting]]

• didn’t plan for any way to retreat out of a situation if it went wrong

• never considered the possibility that their plan might fail

No independent red teaming appears to have taken place.

Instead, the plan itself – while theoretically plausible – compounded optimism bias in each of its stages and, most tellingly, offered no reversionary courses of action [no way to retreat out of a situation if it went wrong], indicated no decision points to determine whether conventional forces should adjust their posture nor envisaged any outcome other than its own success.

Neither did the plan account for the needs of those tasked with implementing it, nor afford any agency to Ukraine.

The FSB’s inaccurate assessment of the reaction of Ukrainian society is much less consequential in how the plan actually unfolded than the fact that there is no evidence in the Russian planning that anyone had asked what would occur if any of its key assumptions were wrong.

(Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 12)

[linked to from summary page: Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022]

Which is why Putin had no “plan B”.

Institute for Study of War says Putin likely made the decision to invade Ukraine in 2020 to 2021

This is ISW's assessment of how Putin came to believe he could take over Ukraine in 10 days.

We need to remember that in February 2022, that Russia had already previously taken over Crimea quickly and with very little actual military effort in 2014.

There was low level fighting in Eastern Donbas along a front line with occasional exchanges of shelling. But the Ukrainian army would not have seemed very formidable to Russia even though he knew it possessed some tanks and fighter jets.

With hindsight it is hard to understand why he thought he could win against such formidable opponent as we now know Ukraine to be but he didn’t know that at the time.

I have reformatted this quote from the ISW using bullet points and slightly rephrased to make it easier for autistic people to read:

QUOTE STARTS

By 2021, all the ways in which Putin tried to regain control over Ukraine – short of a full-scale invasion – had failed.

Putin failed to

• to get Ukraine to join Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union in the 2000s and

• to get pro-Kremlin leaders in charge of the Ukrainian government in 2004.

• to establish full control over Ukraine even when Yanukovych was in power.

Putin was able to solidify some of his territorial gains in Ukraine through the Minsk II Accords that froze the frontlines in Donbas, but he was unable to exploit those gains to achieve his full desired aims.

Putin tried to coerce

• Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) and later

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-present) to legitimize the Russia-created illegal DNR and LNR, and Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea in accord with Ukraine’s Minsk II commitments despite the fact that Russia and the proxies it created had not met their commitments.

These efforts, if successful, would have

• legitimized the principle of Russian military intervention in Ukraine and

• secured for Russia a permanent lever of influence over Ukraine’s politics. (ISW documented this deliberate Kremlin effort in detail in 2019).[38] Putin failed at that too]

Putin’s convictions about Ukraine and the West had likely further solidified over the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

• Putin entered a state of isolation during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, largely confining his interactions to a small group of trusted idealogues. He reportedly began becoming ever more preoccupied with Russia’s need to control Ukraine and avenge itself against the West for “humiliating” Russia in the 1990s

• Sources familiar with Putin’s conversations revealed that Putin began to “obsess over the past” and ”completely lost interest in the present” during the pandemic.

Putin had also just succeeded in a major domestic power play.

• Putin had faced a moment of vulnerability as the 2020 oil price crisis and the pandemic occurred in the middle of his campaign to retain power]

• Putin was attempting to amend the Russian constitution so that he could run again in 2024]

• Putin’s power play went unchallenged, however, and he successfully re-solidified his grip on power with constitutional amendments that effectively allowed him to rule for life.

The success of this domestic power play also undermines the argument that Western “hybrid warfare” was somehow putting Putin’s own rule at risk. Putin’s domestic grip in 2021 was solid and faced no meaningful challenge.

Putin was likely emboldened by his false assessments of

• Ukraine’s capability and

• will to fight.

Ukraine has

• fended off Russian attacks on its sovereignty over the years and

• grown in its resolve as a nation

- a process that went largely unnoticed by Putin and his inner circle of advisors.

Putin had told a European official in September 2014 that he could

• “take Kyiv in two weeks,” and had evidently maintained the same outlook since invading Ukraine in 2014 despite his military failures that year.[44]

Putin misattributed Kyiv’s unwillingness to yield to Russia to

• a small group of Ukrainian politicians controlled by the West (which the Kremlin usually refers to as ‘the Kyiv regime’)

• rather than to the growing self-determination of the Ukrainian people to remain a nation--a determination ironically driven in part by the Russian 2014 invasion and continued pressure.

Putin’s propaganda in the lead-up to the invasion reveals that

• he and his idealogues lived in an echo chamber dominated by an alternate reality in which

• Ukrainians would welcome the Russian forces liberating them from the supposed oppression of the ”Kyiv regime.”[45]

Putin did not see NATO or the West as a power that would counter his ambitions in Ukraine either. A former unnamed intelligence official revealed that Putin’s ”personal banker” and close friend Yuri Kovalchuk, with whom Putin spent considerable time during his isolation, argued to Putin that

• the West was weak and that

• the time was ripe for Russia to demonstrate its military capabilities and ”defend its sovereignty” by invading Ukraine

Former US National Security Council official Fiona Hill stated that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was guided by his belief that

• the West was weak and distracted

Western analysts argued that some of Putin’s elites supported his vision after

• concluding that the West was divided and in decline.

Putin likely concluded that the West

• would not have the will or the strength to deter a swift military operation that would collapse the supposedly unpopular Zelensky government within days.

This belief in the West’s weakness again undermines the Russian-created fiction that Russia had to act to preempt some Western aggression—a West too weak and divided to defend Ukraine was certainly not going to attack Russia out of the blue.

Putin, thus, likely decided to

• begin setting conditions for the invasion sometime in late 2020 or early 2021.

. Institute for the Study of War

This is an account from the Vyorstka online newspaper suggests the decision was made in early March 2021.

QUOTE STARTS

An investigative report by the Vyorstka online newspaper says Russian President Vladimir Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine in early March 2021.

According to the report, which is based on interviews with sources close to the Russian leadership, Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine after Ukrainian authorities confiscated assets and media outlets controlled by Russia-friendly Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk in February 2021.

The preparations for the invasion, launched in late February 2022, took a year with Putin’s close associate, billionaire Yury Kovalchuk, the main supporter of the idea, the report quotes the sources as saying.

According to Vyorstka, Kovalchuk persuaded Putin that it was the right time to launch the invasion as the European Union was facing internal problems and disagreements on a number of issues.

A source told Vyorstka that initially Putin planned to openly threaten Ukraine with aggression in his controversial article On The Historical Unity Of Russians And Ukrainians, which was published in July 2021. However, the threat was taken out of the text at the last moment.

The report quoted a source as saying that a top Russian official said during private conversations on the sidelines of an economic gathering at the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2021 that Russia planned forcibly change the government in Ukraine.

Another source said that, in December 2021, Russia's top officials discussed how Ukraine will be shared between major Russian corporations.

The report quotes a person whom Vyorstka called "Putin’s old friend" as saying that Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu supported Putin's plan as he was sure that the military operation would be quick, in a manner similar to the annexation of Ukraine's Crimea in 2014.

A source in Putin’s administration told Vyorstka that Putin planned to take over Ukraine quickly and did not expect it to last long. That, however, has been proven wrong with Ukraine putting up staunch resistance with the backing of NATO and many of its Western allies.

A former Kremlin official told the website that almost everyone in Russia's political and military elite is against the war in Ukraine.

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-lanned-ukraine-invasion-march-2021-vyorstka/32379171.html

So it was NOT an emotional decision. It was a year in planning.

And he was sure the military operation would be quick like the invasion of Crimea.

That is why he did it. Not out of an emotional decision.

There are many others who say that it wasn't a sudden decision, that Putin made this decision long before and that when he was promising peace to Macron etc it was just a game, he had already decided to invade.

These are the actions of a risk averse calculating man

Despite all his bluff and bluster he is very risk averse as the Institute for the Study of War so often puts it.

TWEET “Putin is a very risk averse individual. He is extremely calculated, and he oftentimes really prefers not to make urgent, rash political decisions that would specifically impact the health of his regime,” said ISW’s Russia deputy team lead @ KatStepanenko

. Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) on X

So - Putin is a very RISK AVERSE and CALCULATING man who DOES NOT ACT OUT OF EMOTION. Of course he has emotions but he doesn't do major decisions out of emotion. He stops and calculates and thinks and calculates again. We have seen tis over and over in the war. It took him two months to finish his calculations for Kursk oblast. and in all that time did ALMOST NOTHING

TEXT ON GRAPHIC

Putin is "A VERY RISK AVERSE INDIVIDUAL" (ISW).

So why did he invade Ukraine? He thought it was ZERO RISK.

Exercises in March 2021 were part of the preparations for invasion.

He planned to

- take Hostomel airport on day 1.

- land tanks and take over Kyiv government next day.

- take over Ukraine in 10 days.

Then this happened.

Debris from unexpectedly destroyed Russian helicopters

Putin was so sure the risk was zero he had no plan B.

Putin was so sure of this plan devised by spied he kept it secret even from most of his generals (Gerasimov knew).

“no evidence in the Russian planning that anyone had asked what would occur if any of its key assumptions were wrong.” — RUSI

There is NO WAY Putin could think using nukes is ZERO RISK no matter what his spies say.

RUSI quote from (Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 : page 12)

I go into MUCH more detail in

Sabrina Singh, Pentagon spokesperson says they see NO PREPARATION TO USE NUKES and they have not raised their own response level

Singh says it is just the rhetoric we've seen before. The Pentagon has been answering questions from reporters like this daily. How is it that Steve Rosenberg, BBC’s Russia correspondent, does not know what the Pentagon says on the topic? Or if he does why doesn’t he say in his op ed?

TEXT ON GRAPHIC:
Is the Pentagon concerned about nukes or changed alert level?

A. We see NO signs of Putin preparing to use nukes and have NOT CHANGED OUR ALERT LEVEL.

Has world war III began?

No. This is just the US as one of 50 or so countries supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
[my short summary for autistic or panicking readers]

Graphic shows title section for “No signs Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Pentagon says” (story in the Kyiv Independent) and transcript of Pentagon press briefing saying the same thing.

This is how the Pentagon put it:

Q: And then I guess I want to ask also, since we're still unclear on whether or not the policy has changed. On the non-nuclear — the change on Russia's stance on the nuclear — what was it, the nuclear doctrine. Under these changes, they're saying that a large attack by a non-nuclear state that's backed by a nuclear state, which would be the United States, that would be treated as a joint assault on Russia. How concerning is that to the Pentagon? And have you changed your posture?

DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SINGH: So, we aren't surprised by Russia's update to its nuclear doctrine. It's something that they've been signaling that they intend to update over the last several weeks. It's the same irresponsible rhetoric that we've seen before and that we've seen frankly for the past two years. So, it's something that we're going to continue to monitor, but we don't have any indications that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon within Ukraine. And we don't see any changes that need to be made to our own nuclear posture as well.

…

Q:  Additionally, given the joint US and NATO escalation of attacks, with Ukraine against Russia, and with China and North Korea joining Russia to form an alliance against the West, would not you say that World War III has begun?

DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SINGH:  I would not say that. That is not the characterization that this building assesses. And you've seen us take measures to deescalate tensions and to — I'm sorry, I'm just speaking like broadly around the world. But when it comes to Ukraine, the commitment of this administration from the very beginning of this war was to help Ukraine take back its sovereign territory.

A decision by another country to invade its sovereign neighbor cannot go unchecked, and that's why you've seen not just the United States, but 50 or so countries all around the world come together and support Ukraine through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. So, this is a global effort to support Ukraine, but I certainly would not characterize it as that. Joseph.

. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing, Nov 19, 2024

Also on the change in the Russian nuclear doctrine - they say it is just rhetoric and nothing to suggest they are preparing to use nukes in Ukraine.k

Q:  And then I guess I want to ask also, since we're still unclear on whether or not the policy has changed. On the non-nuclear — the change on Russia's stance on the nuclear — what was it, the nuclear doctrine. Under these changes, they're saying that a large attack by a non-nuclear state that's backed by a nuclear state, which would be the United States, that would be treated as a joint assault on Russia. How concerning is that to the Pentagon? And have you changed your posture?

DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SINGH:  So, we aren't surprised by Russia's update to its nuclear doctrine. It's something that they've been signaling that they intend to update over the last several weeks. It's the same irresponsible rhetoric that we've seen before and that we've seen frankly for the past two years. So, it's something that we're going to continue to monitor, but we don't have any indications that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon within Ukraine. And we don't see any changes that need to be made to our own nuclear posture as well.

. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing, Nov 19, 2024

Brief moment in the fall of 2022 when Pentagon assessed Russia might use a tactical nuke, quickly stopped by the unusual step of telling Russia exactly what they would do in response (likely using conventional missiles for targets in the Black Sea such as the Black Sea Fleet)

There was a brief moment in the fall of 2022 when the Pentagon did assess a possibility of Putin using a tactical nuke.

Bill Burn said that the CIA assessed Russia might use a tactical nuke "for a moment" in the fall 2022.

"21:22. There was a moment in the fall of 2022 when I think there was a genuine risk of tactical nuclear weapons. I have never thought as an agency that we should be unnecessarily intimidated by that. Putin is a bully. He is going to continue to saber rattle from time to time.

The president sent me to talk to one of our Russian counterparts Sergei Nerishki and at the end of 2022 to make very clear what the consequences of that kind of escalation would be and we've continued to be very direct about that. So I don't think we can afford to be intimidated by that saber rattling or bullying.

. Financial Times Live (@ftlive) on X

"A moment" means they resolved it and there is no longer a risk.

They ended that risk when Bill Burns told Putin through Sergei Nerishki exactly what the USA would do (conventional response) if he did.

This is what Jake Sullivan said at the time:

QUOTE STARTS

Jake Sullivan: we have communicated to the Russians what the consequences would be but we've been careful in how we talk about this publicly because from our perspective we want to lay down the principle that there would be catastrophic consequences but not engage in a game of rhetorical Tit for Tat, so the Russians understand where we are we understand where we are

We are planning for every contingency and we will do what is necessary to deter Russia from taking the step and if they do we will respond decisively.

This is what retired US General Petreaus said about what the US likely said (he doesn't know what they said but is a decent source for a guess about what they said).

QUOTE STARTS

General Patraeus (retired): But that range of options would largely inflict more damage on Russian Ukraine including very likely on Crimea and in the Black Sea as well. And again the effort has been to deter, to persuade the Kremlin, to persuade Putin that this would be a catastrophically bad idea to which the response would be catastrophic in nature. That’s the words of Jake Sullivan, the US national security advisor.

It would be very very unwise for Putin to do this and it would not get him out of this desperate situation in which he finds himself, he would actually find himself in a more desperate situation as a result of this if he were to use these weapons.

Recording here that I did from the program, for checking the transcription only: General-Petraeus.mp4

We know how vulnerable the Black Sea fleet is - back to 2022 when Ukraine sunk the Moskva, the flagship of the fleet which also had the most advanced radar protection of the fleet. Ukraine sunk it with their home built Neptune cruise missile which has a range of around 300 km

TEXT ON GRAPHIC - A “no navy” country Ukraine sunk the flagship of the Russian fleet, the Moskva, in 2022 with two sea skimming Neptune drones. From then on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was pretty much out of the war - they never ventured near the Ukrainian shores and then were forced out of Crimea as well in 2023.

Since then Russia has lost a third of its Black Sea fleet to Ukraine and has had ot move it out of range of the Neptune, ATACMS and stormshadow and so has had to remove it from Crimea because all of Crimea is now within range of Ukraine’s missiles.

But NOWHERE in the Black Sea is far enough to be out of the range of the Tomahawk cruise missiles even fired from the Mediterranean.

TEXT ON GRAPHIC

Range of the US tomahawk cruise missile with a half ton payload like the ATACMS, travels at nearly 1000 km / hour, range 2,400 km.

Proven ability to get through Russia's S-400 system

With the current state of Russian air defences, teh US could sink the entire Russian Black Sea fleet in a few hours but doesn't give this capability to ukraine.

Details of the missile here: Tomahawk (missile) - Wikipedia

Circle drawn with this free online map circle drawing tool Radius Around a Point on a Map

Russia seems unable even to stop modified microlight hobbyist aircraft loaded with explosives! This is about how Ukraine is using modified microlights as long range attack drones. Ukraine appears to deploy modified A-22 ultralights as suicide UAVs

If Ukraine had those, then given how vulnerable the Russian warships have been since it sunk the Moskkva, Ukraine could sink the Russian ships anywhere in the Black Sea.

Russia would no longer have a Black Sea fleet the day after Ukraine got the missiles. But the US would be too worried about giving Ukraine that capability.

I don’t think many in the West realize quite how devastating it would be to Putin to lose his Black Sea fleet. This is why Ukraine sees the Tomahawk cruise missiles as a big lever it could use in negotiations with Putin.

TEXT ON GRAPHIC

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is of huge national pride to the Russians. Ukraine has already sunk its flagship and a third of its ships with the ATACMS, stormshadows and its own native Neptune but most have retreated out of reach to the far side of the Black Sea.

If Ukaine had the Tomahawk cruise missile it could sink the entire fleet - gone from the Black Sea for the first time since it began in 1783

A major lever for negotiations with Russia from a position of strength.

Black Sea Fleet - just before the start of the Crimean war of 1853-6

Graphic: Ivan Aivazovsky. Black Sea Fleet in the Bay of Theodosia, Crimea, just before the Crimean War

So - it is likely that the US threatened to sink what’s left of Putin’s Black Sea fleet and destroy other assets on the land back in 2022 if he used a single tactical nuke in Ukraine.

Others say that it was not very likely that Russia seriously considered a nuke even then.

But before and after that they have always said there is no sign of preparation and the risk no longer exists, if it did exist for a short time in the fall of 2022.

More details here:

SHORT DEBUNK: No risk of Russia using a tactical nuke in Ukraine - CIA says there MIGHT have been a risk "FOR A MOMENT" in the fall of 2022 - they assess the risk no longer exists after they told Russia exactly how USA would respond - with conventional missiles

China and India’s opposition to use or threat of use of nukes by Russia

President Xi joined President Biden in underscoring China’s opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Here is the readout of the meeting between Biden and Xi Jingping

QUOTE The two leaders exchanged views on key regional and global challenges. President Biden raised Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine and Russia’s irresponsible threats of nuclear use. President Biden and President Xi reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

. Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House

Rajnath Singh, defence minister of India also, h

QUOTE STARTS

Had a telephonic conversation with the Defence Minister of Russia, Mr Sergei Shoigu today. We discussed bilateral defence cooperation as well as the deteriorating situation in Ukraine.

He briefed me on the evolving situation in Ukraine, including his concerns about possible provocations through use of ‘dirty bomb’.

I reiterated India's position on the need to pursue the path of dialogue and diplomacy for an early resolution of the conflict.

https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/1585214938242764800

Continued:

https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/1585214946950152193

It's obvious if Russia used nukes in Ukraine then both China and India would have to oppose them. See:

BLOG: China and India both telling Russia not to use nukes - and many others saying they don’t expect Putin to use nukes - including full transcript of Boris Johnson’s remarks about how it would make Russia a rogue nation

Boris Johnson’s take as prime minister

Here is Boris Johnson’s take on it, back when he was prime minister:

If Putin used nukes he would:

• "tender Russia's resignation from the club of civilized nations"

• "Russia would be put into a kind of cryogenic economic freeze"

Text on graphic: Q. Asked if Putin would use a tactical nuke.
Boris Johnson’s view: Not a realistic possibility of nukes

Boris Johnson says that if Putin uses a nuke:
- “He would immediately tender Russia's resignation from the club of civilized Nations."
- "It would be a total disaster for his country."
- "Russia would be put into a kind of cryogenic economic freeze"
- "There's a lot of of willingness to give Putin the benefit of the doubt. That will go the minute he does anything like that [if he uses a nuke]."
- "And above all in his own country I think he would trigger an absolutely hysterical reaction".
"So I don't think that is a realistic possibility [for Putin to use nukes]."

Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of UK during first few months of Ukraine invasion

Screenshot from: .Exclusive with Boris Johnson on the Ukraine conflict (4:51)

BLOG: China and India both telling Russia not to use nukes - and many others saying they don’t expect Putin to use nukes - including full transcript of Boris Johnson’s remarks about how it would make Russia a rogue nation

Everyone agrees that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought - not as a treaty - just agreeing on a self evident truth

All five permanent security council members signed a statement saying that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. Not as an agreement. As something they all recognize as true.

That's Russia, China, UK, US and France.

And that isn't a concession. It's not a promise or a treaty. It is just rational sense. This is something goes back to Reagen first to state it really clearly

.

“We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”

Uses the graphic from the US embacy in the UK: Joint Statement of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races

https://uk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-of-the-leaders-of-the-five-nuclear-weapon-states-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/

The full quote is

A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?

In context:

We can now move with confidence to seize the opportunities for peace, and we will.

Tonight, I want to speak to the people of the Soviet Union, to tell them it's true that our governments have had serious differences, but our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war. And if we Americans have our way, they never will.

People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?

People of the Soviet, President Dwight Eisenhower, who fought by your side in World War II, said the essential struggle "is not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war." Americans are people of peace. If your government wants peace, there will be peace. We can come together in faith and friendship to build a safer and far better world for our children and our children's children. And the whole world will rejoice. That is my message to you.

. State of the Union Address: Ronald Reagan (January 25, 1984)

Starts about 35:20 into the video here

. January 25, 1984: State of the Union Address | Miller Center

Russia and China have repeated it since the Ukraine war. This is from Tass, Russian propaganda but it is a good source on what Russia itself has signed:

QUOTE STARTS

Russia and China are convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be unleashed, according to the Joint Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the New Era signed by Russian and Chinese Presidents, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, on Tuesday after their talks in Moscow.

"Stressing the importance of the joint statement by the leaders of the five countries, which possess nuclear weapons, on the prevention of a nuclear war and an arms race, the sides once again state that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must never be unleashed,"

. Russia, China convinced that nuclear war must never be unleashed — joint statement

Need for a journalist code of ethics to prevent this type of clickbait on such a serious subject

This is the BBC. Most people in the UK see them as highly reliable and a trustworthy source on topics like this. It is especialy important for them to get it right.

How could Steve Rosenberg be a Russia correspondent for the BBC and not know all these things?

If he does know these things, why doesn’t he mention any of them on such a serious topic at a time when many people are panicking about it?

I think we need a journalist code of ethics to prevent this happening.

There are likely a few people who have committed suicide on the night that he did that broadcast because of this FALSE story. It is serious stuff and not to be played with.

The BBC surely interviewed lots of people to find someone who would say that Putin acts on his emotions which is NONSENSE. Because so few people say this.

Anyone who has looked at any depth into the extensive research over the last two years into why he invaded Ukraine knows he is risk averse and a careful calculating man who made the decision to invade likely nearly a year ago, certainly long before the invasion.

The relevance of this is that it is impossible that Putin would assess that he has a 100% risk free way of defeating NATO.

Instead he would assess his chances as 0% and near certainty that his people would no longer support him if he did something as stupid as to use nukes - and then lose his entire Black Sea fleet.

Based on what Boris Johnson said - the big issue for Russia would be how to return to to the club of civilized nations. They would likely have to depose Putin or surrender him to the International Criminal Court before Russia would be trusted again. Putin has to know this.

But the BBC managed to find someone who hadn’t read any of this research and yet was willing to venture an opinion about something he had never studied and said that Putin invaded Ukraine as an emotional decision.

The BBC need FACT CHECKERS for something so serious as this.

It is not the fault of the columnist. Academics easily slip up. It could even have been part of a longer conversation where he thought he was being interviewed about something else.

It is the fault of the BBC for not checking what he said before running it on prime-time TV like that.

The BBC needs to stop the misreporting on such a serious issue - which may have led some people to suicide when they heard the broadcast

There are two possibilities here.

1. That the BBC is simply unaware of what the Pentagon, ISW, Russi etc say. This seems extraordinarily unlikely but it may be possible. I don't know how Steve Rosenberg, their Russia correspondent, couldn't know about these things.

2. That they do know all this but they are intentionally using low-quality sources that say the opposite for the sake of a vivid engaging story to keep audience attention.

Both reflect very badly on the BBC.

Either they have very careless incompetent researchers which I consider to be unlikely, or they are deliberately presenting a picture to the public that they know to be false on a VERY serious subject.

There are likely people without access to fact checkers like ourselves who have actually killed themselves over this FALSE story.

The BBC's distortions need to STOP. And they are doing Putin's work for him too. He wants us all to be scared so that we pressure our governments in halting military support of Ukraine. This is the ONLY reason he does this.

By misreporting the situation the BBC is doing Putin's work for him.

Fact checkers - please be patient and listen to anyone who contacts you who is suicidal

This is a message I wrote in our group to our fact checkers (slightly shortened)

Please be patient without members, please especially at this time do NOT attack them for being scared and listen to their concerns and debunk patiently - as our more vulnerable members navigate this difficult time for them.

If you can't do that please leave it to others who can reply with sympathy and empathy.

If members are suicidal, we can help them as, for instance, friends or family would help someone who is suicidal. Above all they need someone to talk to, who will listen to them.

Tell them about the various forms of help available - psychologists, suicide help lines - and that in an emergency if they feel suicidal they can go to the nearest emergency room at a hospital and they have a duty to protect you.

It IS okay to let them talk about their suicidal thoughts - this doesn't make them more likely to kill themselves.

Reminder to anyone seriously suicidal - do get help

If you are seriously suicidal do get help! We are here to help you as best we can, in the way friends are advised to do to help someone suicidal - but there is no way we are any substitute for professional help.

Here are some thoughts that help some people who are suicidal - I shared a list of thoughts like this and asked suicidal members which they found most useful.

- Suicide is for ever - your entire future.

- It doesn't solve anything, it only makes things worse for the people you leave behind.

- Soon, this will all be a memory.

Also if you feel you are at risk of taking your own life, this is as much of a medical emergency as a heart attack and you can go to your nearest emergency response room and ask to be helped and they are obligated to help you, assess your situation. If you are at high risk you get monitored and get emergency treatment usually for a few days until the suicidal thoughts reduce enough so that you are safe again.

This is an article I did to help suicidal people and those who support others who feel suicidal or say they are going to commit suicide, based on summarizing some of the professional advice on what to do.

. Supporting someone who is suicidal

SEE ALSO

also

also

also

also

For scared people: many things you may believe about the Ukraine war are EASILY SHOWN to be false or unsupported - example list of claims I fact check because nobody else seems to

FOR MORE HELP

To find a debunk see: List of articles in my Debunking Doomsday blog to date See also my Short debunks

Scared and want a story debunked? Post to our Facebook group. Please look over the group rules before posting or commenting as they help the group to run smoothly

• Facebook group Doomsday Debunked

Also do join our facebook group if you can help with fact checking or to help scared people who are panicking.

SEARCH LIST OF DEBUNKS

You can search by title and there’s also an option to search the content of the blog using a google search.

CLICK HERE TO SEARCH: List of articles in my Debunking Doomsday blog to date

NEW SHORT DEBUNKS

I do many more fact checks and debunks on our facebook group than I could ever write up as blog posts. They are shorter and less polished but there is a good chance you may find a short debunk for some recent concern.

See Latest short debunks for new short debunks

I also do tweets about them. I also tweet the debunks and short debunks to my Blue Sky page here:

. doomsdaydebunks.bsky.social

Then on the Doomsday Debunked wiki, see my Short Debunks page which is a single page of all the earlier short debunks in one page.

I do the short debunks more often but they are less polished - they are copies of my longer replies to scared people in the Facebook group.